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Earnings Top-up (ETU) was an in-work benefit available to low paid workers
without children.  ETU was piloted from October 1996 to October 1999 in
eight areas across Britain.  This volume is part of a set of seven final reports
from the evaluation of the ETU pilot.  (Baseline statistics were published in
1999, in DSS Research Report No. 95, and interim evaluation findings
were published in March 2000, DSS Research Reports Nos. 112 and 113).
The evaluation was conducted by researchers at the Policy Studies Institute
(PSI), the Centre for Research in Social Policy (CRSP) at Loughborough
University and the Institute for Employment Research (IER) at the University
of Warwick.  Outline details of the evaluation are provided in this report.
Further information on the evaluation can be found in the six other final
reports from the ETU evaluation:
Earnings Top-up Evaluation: The Synthesis Report (Marsh, A., 2001,
Department of Social Security Research Report No. 135).  This report
draws together the main results of the evaluation in one volume.  The aim
of this report is to provide a relatively short and non-technical overview of
the evaluation’s conclusions drawn from all strands of the evaluation.  It is
intended that this will help readers identify the sources to which they can
turn for fuller information on the evaluation.
Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Employers’ Reactions (Lissenburgh,
S., Hasluck, C and Green A., 2001, Department of Social Security Research
Report No. 132). This report is in two parts.  The first presents findings
from the surveys with employers carried out by PSI during the ETU pilot.
It explores employer’s experiences of ETU focusing on wage effects and
hours worked.  The second part is econometric analysis, undertaken by
IER, which considers the effects of ETU on employers’ behaviour and the
recruitment process.
Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Effects on Low Paid Workers (Marsh,
A., Stephenson, A., Dorsett, R and Elias, P., 2001, Department of Social
Security Research Report No. 134).  This report is in two parts.  The first
section, by PSI, presents findings of the surveys conducted with low paid
workers and ETU recipients throughout the pilot.  It explores the
characteristics of these workers and the effect that ETU had on their lives
and examines the reasons for non take-up of ETU among eligible workers.
The second part, by IER, analyses the same data to explore the wider labour
market and potential long-term effects of ETU.
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Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Qualitative Evidence (Heaver, C.
Roberts, S. Stafford, B. and Vincent, J. 2001, Department of Social Security
Research Report No. 133).  This report presents the findings of qualitative
research conducted by CRSP as part of the evaluation of ETU.  The report
has three parts focusing on ex-recipients of ETU, self-employed recipients
and unsuccessful ETU applicants.
Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Staff Views (Vincent J., Heaver, C.,
Roberts, S. and Stafford, B., 2001, Department of Social Security In-house
Research Report No. 74).  This report presents the findings of the staff
panels drawn from the eight pilot areas, and from central administrative/
processing staff from the Benefits Agency and Employment Service staff
over the three years of the pilot.  The report focuses on staff’s views of ETU
and the way in which it operated within the pilot areas.  It also considers
changes over time from the beginning of the pilot to its end in 1999.
Earnings Top-up Evaluation: Labour Market Conditions (Green, A.
2001, Department of Social Security In-house Research Report No. 75)
This report, by IER, draws out the contrasts and similarities in labour market
conditions across local areas included in the ETU pilot.
Previously published research in the ETU series include:
Low Paid Work in Britain (Marsh, A., Callender, C., Finlayson, L.,
Ford, R., Green, A and White, M., 1999, Department of Social Security
Research Report No. 95).  This report presents the findings from the first
surveys conducted prior to the introduction of Earnings Top-up, with
employers low paid workers and medium term unemployed people.  Baseline
data on the characteristics of these groups are presented, including health
and education, wage expectations, earnings, wage setting behaviour and
recruitment.  Preliminary information on the labour market profiles of the
evaluation areas is also included.
The First Effects of Earnings Top-up (Finlayson, L., Ford, R., Marsh,
A., Smith, A., and White, M., 1999, Department of Social Security Research
Report No. 112).  This report presents the findings from surveys conducted
in 1997, almost one year after the introduction of ETU with employers,
low paid workers, medium term unemployed people and ETU recipients.
The report presents interim analysis of the first effects of ETU over this
period.
Piloting Change (Vincent, J., Abbott, D., Heaver, C., Maguire, S., Miles,
A., Stafford, D., 1999, Department of Social Security Research Report No.
113).  This report presents the interim findings from three components of
the ETU qualitative research: two group discussions with the Employment
Service and Benefits Agency staff; face-to-face interviews with ETU
recipients; and telephone interviews with employers.
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This report consists of two parts, both of which provide crucial evidence
that informs the conclusions of the evaluation of ETU:
Part One, by Stephen Lissenburgh contains the findings from the surveys
with employers carried out by PSI during the ETU pilot.  This explores
employers’ experiences of ETU, focusing on wage effects and hours worked.
Part Two, by Chris Hasluck and Anne Green contains econometric
analysis, carried out by IER.  This outlines the effects of ETU on employers’
behaviour and the recruitment process.

1SUMMARY
Earnings Top-up (ETU) was introduced in October 1996 in eight areas
of the country for a three-year pilot period.  It was an in-work benefit
for people without dependent children.  There were two different rates
of benefit (Scheme A and Scheme B) and it was available to employed
and self-employed people who worked at 16 or more hours per week in
jobs lasting at least five weeks.  It was paid at a fixed rate for a period of
26 weeks and the maximum amount of benefit payable was reduced by
70 pence for each pound above the threshold.  The two main objectives
of ETU were to improve the incentive for unemployed people to take
low-paid work of 16 or more hours a week and to help low-paid workers
to avoid unemployment by raising their incomes relative to out-of-work
support.
The programme of evaluative research was designed to compare eight
test areas with four more areas chosen as ‘control areas’ at different points
over the three-year period.  The evaluation of ETU included field surveys
of low-paid workers, unemployed people, ETU recipients and employers
together with ongoing analysis of official administrative statistics, studies
of local labour market conditions, and in-depth interviews with key
participants.  The focus here is on one part of the evaluation: the surveys
of employers.  The initial sample was interviewed in summer 1996 and
again in summer 1997.  In 1999, employers who had been interviewed
in both 1996 and 1997 were re-interviewed.  These employers constitute
a ‘panel’ from whom data was obtained at three points in time.  The
1999 survey also interviewed a cross-section of employers with the same
characteristics as the initial sample interviewed in 1996.  This report
discusses the panel sample and also compares the 1996 and 1999 cross-
section surveys.
The main objective of the employers’ strand of the ETU pilot evaluation
was to assess the impact of the benefit on employers’ wage-setting and
labour recruitment behaviour.  It was possible that employers would
become aware of ETU and adjust their behaviour as a consequence.
They might have been expected to target their recruitment on those
eligible for the benefit at the expense of existing and prospective non-
eligible employees (a substitution effect) or to have held down or even
reduced their wage offers (a wage effect) in response to the new benefit.
However, it was more likely that any effect would come via the operation
of the labour market at the local level.  If ETU attracted a greater number
of people into the labour market at lower wages then according to the
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2theory of labour supply this increase in the supply of labour would lead
to a reduction in market wage offers and an expansion in employment,
other things being equal.
If employers’ behaviour was affected by the introduction of ETU, then a
number of outcomes might therefore be expected, notably:
• Lower wages - this is most likely to manifest itself as a moderation in the
rate of increase in wage offers in the pilot areas (Schemes A and B)
compared with the Control areas, particularly in the semi-skilled/
unskilled and clerical/sales job groups and within low-paid employment.
• Higher employment rates - this is likely to be seen in a willingness of
employers to accommodate (potential) employees who might qualify
for the new benefit, for instance, by adjusting their hours of work.
This might also be seen in a greater proportion of employees working
16 hours per week or more in 1999 compared with 1996 in the pilot
areas but not the control areas.
• New jobs - recruitment, particularly at low hourly rates of pay, might
also be expected to have increased in response to ETU.  Some
employees may have been able to enter the labour market at wage
offers lower than they would otherwise have accepted in the absence
of ETU.  In addition, employers may have been able to create new
jobs as a result of ETU, thereby opening up new lines of profit for
their enterprise, and be more able to recruit to ‘hard-to-fill’ vacancies
as a result of the new benefit.
• Employment policy - ETU might also be expected to have had some
effect on employers’ levels of awareness and experience of in-work
benefits.
As in 1996, most establishments were in the private sector (82 per cent).
A quarter of the employers (27 per cent) were in distribution industries,
while 14 per cent were in hotel and catering and 12 per cent were in
manufacturing.  The majority of establishments (61 per cent) were
independent, in that they did not form part of a larger organisation,
while a quarter (27 per cent) were branches of a larger organisation and
the remaining 12 per cent were the Head Office of a larger group (Section
2.1).
Employers were asked in detail about employment in three relatively
low-paying groups:
• semi-skilled and unskilled employees;
• skilled and craft employees;
• clerical and sales employees.
Employers in the hotel and catering industries had a predominantly semi-
skilled/unskilled workforce (57 per cent).  Those in agriculture, mining
or construction had the highest proportion of skilled/craft employees
2  Main characteristics of the
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3(41 per cent), while employers in distribution and public administration
each had a high proportion of their workforce made up of clerical/sales
employees (41 per cent) (Section 2.2).
Whether ETU had any effect on wage offers would depend partly on the
way in which pay levels are set and the influences on this.  More than
half of the employers interviewed in 1999 (55 per cent) said ‘the pay
individuals are willing to work for’ influenced their wage-setting
behaviour; four out of ten (42 per cent) mentioned ‘the pay offered by
other local employers’ and ‘national agreements and national pay trends’;
and a similar proportion (38 per cent) said ‘the availability or scarcity of
labour’ had some influence on the rates of pay they offered to employees.
With the exception of ‘national agreements and national pay trends’,
these most commonly mentioned influences on levels of pay offered by
employers could allow ETU to have an effect through the workings of
the local labour market (Section 2.3).
Another factor that could influence the potential for ETU to have a
‘wage effect’ is the extent to which employers have wage policy autonomy.
Overall, eight out of ten employers (79 per cent) had local autonomy to
determine pay levels (Section 2.3).
The ability of ETU to have an effect on recruitment through a ‘substitution
effect’, whereby employers may target their recruitment on those eligible
for the benefit at the expense of existing non-eligible employees, would
depend partly on employers’ autonomy in recruitment procedures.
Overall, eight out of ten employers (80 per cent) had local autonomy in
their recruitment procedures (Section 2.4).
Among the job groups where ETU would be expected to have its greatest
effect – semi/unskilled and clerical/sales jobs – there was mixed evidence
regarding employment effects among the panel sample of employers.
Levels of semi/unskilled employment were maintained between 1996
and 1999 in the pilot areas but fell substantially in the Control areas, a
difference consistent with an ETU effect.  However, clerical/sales
employment grew more strongly in Control than in pilot areas, contrary
to expectation (Section 3.1).
It was also expected that ETU may have an effect on labour turnover.
Recruitment would be expected to increase at the lower end of the wage
distribution in response to ETU and some employees may find they are
able to stay in jobs longer because of the new benefit, thereby reducing
termination of employment.  Termination rates in semi/unskilled
employment were indeed lower in the ETU pilot than in the Control
areas in 1999.  Whereas termination rates in this job group were 42 per
cent in Control areas, they were 29 per cent in Scheme B areas and 26
per cent in Scheme A areas.  Contrary to expectation, however,
recruitment rates were also lower for semi/unskilled employment in the
Wages
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4pilot areas, running at 35 per cent in both Scheme A and Scheme B areas
compared with 47 per cent in the Control areas (Section 3.1).
Entitlement to ETU begins at 16 hours per week and there is an extra
credit available to those who work for 30 or more hours per week.  It
might be expected, therefore, that employers in ETU areas would
experience an increase in the proportion of their employees working 16
to 29 hours per week or 30 hours or more per week, rather than 1 to 15
hours per week, compared to employers in the Control areas.  The only
clear evidence to support this contention related to maintenance of full-
time working in Scheme A areas, compared to Scheme B and Control
areas.  In both Scheme B and Control areas the proportion of semi/
unskilled employees who worked 30 hours or more per week fell quite
sharply from 1996 to 1999, a decline from 63 per cent to 54 per cent in
Scheme B areas and from 65 per cent to 52 per cent in Control areas.
No such decline took place in Scheme A areas, however, so that by 1999
the proportion of semi/unskilled employees who worked full-time in
these areas (61 per cent) was higher than in Scheme B and Control areas
(Section 3.2).
The introduction of ETU was expected to constrain wage growth among
recent low-paid recruits in the pilot relative to the Control areas.  Overall,
the average starting wage of employers’ most recent low-paid recruit
increased from £3.18 per hour in 1996 to £3.47 in 1999.  This wage
growth was more limited in Scheme A areas than elsewhere, rising from
£3.24 per hour to £3.39 (an increase of 5 per cent), compared with
wage growth of 11 and 12 per cent respectively in Scheme B and Control
areas.  As expected, the starting wage paid to employers’ most recent
low-paid recruit was heavily influenced by the National Minimum Wage,
introduced in April 1999.  Four out of 10 employers (38 per cent) who
recruited someone at £4 per hour or below in the past year in 1999 did
so at the adult minimum wage of £3.60 per hour (Table 3.19).  This
proportion did not vary by evaluation area, but Scheme A employers
were more likely than those in other areas to pay their low-paid recruits
less than £3.60 per hour and less likely to pay them more than £3.60 per
hour (29 per cent, as against 41 per cent in Control areas).  These findings
are suggestive of an ETU ‘wage effect’ for low-paid recruits in Scheme A
areas (Section 3.3).
There was a high level of general awareness of in-work benefits among
the employers interviewed but less than a third (32 per cent) reported
actual experience of their lower paid employees being entitled to in-
work benefits (Section 3.4).
Awareness of ETU increased between 1996 and 1999, especially in Scheme
B areas.  However, only six per cent of employers in the pilot areas
interviewed in 1999 reported any actual experience of ETU.  Knowledge
of the eligibility criteria for ETU was low even among those who said
they had heard of ETU and was no higher than it had been in 1997
(Section 3.4).
Hours of work
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5Multivariate analyses, which control systematically for differences between
employers, were carried out to provide a robust test of ETU’s impact on
wages and employment.
ETU had no impact on the change in wages of semi-skilled/unskilled
employees between 1996 and 1999, nor on the change in wages of clerical/
sales employees between 1996 and 1999.  Where employers had become
aware of ETU by 1999, however, whereas they had not been aware in
1996, this was associated with the payment of lower wage increases to
clerical/sales employees.  This suggests that where employers show
increased awareness of ETU, the benefit is more likely to restrain wage
growth (Section 4.1).
If ETU had exerted a ‘wage effect’ this should be manifested in an increase
in the proportion of low-paid employment within the semi/unskilled
and clerical/sales job groups in the pilot relative to the Control areas.
ETU had no effect on the change between 1996 and 1999 in the
proportion of semi/unskilled employees who were low-paid.  Increased
awareness of ETU, however, was again associated with a change consistent
with theoretical expectations - where employers were aware of ETU in
1999 whereas they had not been in 1996, this was associated with an
increase in the proportion of low-paid employment within the semi-
skilled/unskilled job group (Section 4.2).
ETU also had no effect on the change in the proportion of low-paid
clerical/sales employment between 1996 and 1999.  Increased awareness
was again associated, however, with an increase in the proportion of
low-wage employment, although in this case it was increased awareness
of in-work benefits in general rather than ETU in particular that was
important (Section 4.2).
The change in hourly wage offers to the most recent low-paid recruit
between 1996 and 1999 was subject to an ETU effect.  After controlling
for other variables influencing wage change, employers located in Scheme
B areas reported slower wage growth than was the case in Control areas.
This is the type of effect ETU would be expected to have if the benefit
was making low-paid work more attractive for eligible employees. There
was no such effect in Scheme A areas.  Awareness of ETU and in-work
benefits in general was also associated with slower wage growth, albeit
not strongly.  If employers were aware of ETU in 1999 having not been
in 1996, hourly wage offers to the most recent low-paid recruit rose
more slowly than was otherwise the case.  The same was true if employers
became aware of in-work benefits in general during the course of the
evaluation period (Section 4.3).
The survey of employers set out to assess the impact of ETU on employers’
behaviour.  A number of outcomes following the introduction of the
new benefit were expected: lower wages, higher employment rates and
the creation of new jobs; a change in employment policy; and an increase
in awareness of in-work benefits.
4  Assessing the impact of ETU
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6Among the job groups where ETU would be expected to have its greatest
effect – semi/unskilled and clerical/sales jobs – there was mixed evidence
regarding employment effects among the panel sample of employers.
Levels of semi/unskilled employment were maintained between 1996
and 1999 in the pilot areas but fell substantially in the Control areas, a
difference consistent with an ETU effect.  However, clerical/sales
employment grew more strongly in Control than in pilot areas, contrary
to expectation.  There was no evidence that recruitment difficulties had
eased following the introduction of ETU.
Awareness of in-work benefits was high, although less than a third of
employers reported any actual experience of these benefits.  Awareness
of ETU rose between 1996 and 1999, especially in Scheme B areas,
though only six per cent of employers in the pilot areas reported any
experience of ETU by 1999.
Of the three most common influences on the levels of pay offered by
employers, two of them - the pay individuals are willing to accept and
the pay offered by other local employers - give considerable scope for an
ETU ‘wage effect’.  No such effect emerged clearly from the descriptive
analysis, however, which instead produced a lot of conflicting evidence.
For example, while among the panel sample of employers wages grew
more slowly for semi/unskilled and clerical/sales workers between 1996
and 1999 in Scheme B areas than in Scheme A or Control areas, the
average proportion of each job group earning £4 per hour or below in
1999 did not vary by evaluation area.  The one area in which the
descriptive evidence was a little more consistent was in relation to recent
low-paid recruits.  Thus, analysis of the cross-section surveys showed
that recent low-paid recruits were paid more in 1999 than equivalent
workers in 1996 in all areas, but this wage growth was slower in Scheme
A areas than in Scheme B or Control areas and, among the panel sample,
the average pay of recent low-paid recruits rose more quickly between
1996 and 1999 in Control areas than in pilot areas.
The multivariate modelling produced limited evidence of an ETU effect
on wages.  There was no evidence of an ETU effect on change in hourly
wages of clerical/sales and semi/unskilled employees between 1996 and
1999, nor on the change in the proportion of employees in these job
groups who were low-paid.  But in relation to the change in wages of
the most recent low-paid recruit a clear ETU ‘wage effect’ did emerge,
albeit only in relation to Scheme B areas, where wage growth was slower
for recent low-paid recruits than in Control areas.
Employment and new jobs
Employment policy
Wages
7This report examines the wider labour market impact of the Earnings
Top-up (ETU) pilot programme in terms of the impact of the in-work
benefit on the recruitment of low-paid workers.  The report summarises
the results of research concerned with the possible impact of ETU on
ability of employers to recruit workers to vacant, low-paid jobs.
As an example of an in-work benefit (a welfare benefit paid to people
who are in paid work), ETU has two main objectives.  First, to increase
the incomes of low-paid workers.  Second, to strengthen the incentive
to take low-paid jobs.  By shifting the balance away from out-of-work
income towards in-work income, an impact on employment could be
expected.  However, increased competition for low-paid jobs or overt
actions by employers could negate such gains and the overall impact of
ETU on employment levels remains uncertain and is a central concern
for any evaluation of ETU.
The research drew upon data from two sources.  These were, first, the
time series of vacancies notified to the Employment Service (ES) in the
ETU pilot and Control areas.  Second, the research examined survey
data relating to recruitment collected from employers as part of the
evaluation of ETU.  The analysis proceeded in the following stages:
• A consideration of the scope for ETU employment effects.
• An examination of ES notified vacancies.
• An analysis of employers’ recruitment of low-paid workers.
• A conclusion.
A number of different analytical methods were used, including inspection
of time series, descriptive statistical analysis and, finally, some multivariate
analysis.
Analysis of ES data on vacancies revealed no clear evidence of ETU
having had an impact on either the structure of vacancies or the time
taken to fill vacancies in the Scheme A and Scheme B areas, relative to
the Control areas or to Great Britain.  The evidence derived from surveys
of employers was more mixed.  The data suggested that ETU may have
increased both employment and recruitment in Scheme A areas while
the share of low-paid skilled employment increased in Scheme B areas
(the area in which the higher of the two ETU benefits was paid).  Despite
this, the evidence relating to vacancy durations provided only weak, if
any, support for an ETU effect.  Nonetheless, the analysis of recruitment
suggested that employers who had not recruited low-paid workers in
1996 (before ETU) were more likely to have recruited a low-paid worker
in 1997 (after ETU) if they were ‘aware’ of in-work benefits.
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This chapter provides a brief outline of the Earnings Top-up (ETU)
pilot evaluation and the part played by the survey of employers.
ETU was introduced in October 1996 in eight areas of the country for a
three-year pilot period.  It was an in-work benefit for people without
dependent children.  The two main objectives of ETU were to improve
the incentive for unemployed people to take low-paid work of 16 or
more hours a week and to help low-paid workers to avoid unemployment
by raising their incomes relative to out-of-work support.
The programme of evaluative research was designed to compare eight
test areas with four more areas chosen as control areas of corresponding
type at different points over the three year period.  The areas were selected
because they had high levels of unemployment, a high number of job
vacancies and a high proportion of low-paid vacancies and so were areas
where ETU was expected to have the most impact.  Four types of labour
markets were also selected: major urban areas, large towns, seaside areas,
and rural areas.
The two main target groups for ETU were existing low-paid workers
and unemployed people.  For the first group, ETU may have encouraged
them to remain in work rather than returning to unemployment, whereas
for unemployed people ETU could have allowed them to consider a job
that paid less than they would normally have accepted.  If people were
more able to accept low-paid work then this could, in turn, have impacted
on the decisions employers made about recruitment and wages.  The
evaluation of the effects of ETU therefore included corresponding field
surveys of low-paid workers and unemployed people.  Alongside these
were similar field surveys of ETU recipients and telephone surveys of
employers (Figure 1.1).  The evaluation programme also included analysis
of official administrative statistics, studies of local labour market conditions,
and in-depth interviews with key participants.
The focus in this report is on just one part of the evaluation: the surveys
of employers (Figure 1.1).
1.1  Overview
1.2  The ETU evaluation
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The main objective of the employers strand of the Earnings Top-up
(ETU) pilot evaluation is to assess the impact of the benefit on employers’
wage-setting and labour recruitment behaviour.  It is possible that
employers may become aware of ETU and adjust their behaviour as a
consequence.  They may target their recruitment on those eligible for
the benefit at the expense of existing and prospective non-eligible
employees (a substitution effect) or they may hold down or even reduce
their wage offers (a wage effect) in response to the new benefit.  However,
it is more likely that any effect will come via the operation of the labour
market at the local level.  If ETU attracts a greater number of people into
the labour market at lower wages then according to the theory of labour
supply (Polachek and Siebert, 1993) this increase in the supply of labour
would lead to a reduction in market wage offers and an expansion in
employment, other things being equal.
This has an important implication – employers need not be aware of
ETU for it to have an effect on their wage offers or other conditions of
employment.  They would simply respond to changed labour market
conditions and lower their wage offers in order to remain competitive
and avoid displacement effects whereby better-paying employers are forced
into unprofitability1.
1 The potential reduction in wages of ETU employers may improve their competitive
position compared with higher-wage employers who are not directly affected by
ETU.  The resulting job losses in higher-wage employers would represent the
displacement effects of ETU.
13
If employers’ behaviour has been affected by the introduction of ETU,
then a number of outcomes might therefore be expected, notably:
• Lower wages - this is most likely to manifest itself as a moderation in the
rate of increase in wage offers in the pilot areas (Schemes A and B)
compared with the Control areas, particularly in the semi-skilled/
unskilled and clerical/sales job groups and within low-paid employment.
• Higher employment rates - this is likely to be seen in a willingness of
employers to accommodate (potential) employees who might qualify
for the new benefit, for instance, by adjusting their hours of work.
This might also be seen in a greater proportion of employees working
16 hours per week or more in 1999 compared with 1996 in the pilot
areas but not the Control areas.
• New jobs - recruitment, particularly at low hourly rates of pay, might
also be expected to have increased in response to ETU.  Some
employees may be able to enter the labour market at wage offers lower
than they would otherwise have accepted in the absence of ETU.  In
addition, employers may be able to create new jobs as a result of ETU,
thereby opening up new lines of profit for their enterprise, and be
more able to recruit to ‘hard-to-fill’ vacancies as a result of the new
benefit.
• Employment policy - ETU might also be expected to have had some
effect on employers’ levels of awareness and experience of in-work
benefits.
A sample of 2400 employers was interviewed in the summer of 1996
prior to the introduction of ETU in October of that year.  The sample
was drawn from the British Telecommunications ‘Connections in
Business’ database.  The survey consisted of telephone interviews with
employers in the 12 ETU evaluation areas – approximately 200 in each
area.  The sample design was stratified to ensure the inclusion of large
employers (200 or more employees) and over-sampled employers in
traditionally low-paying areas of work.  A self-completion ‘jobs factsheet’
was sent in advance of the interview which enabled employers to prepare
some factual information.  The overall response rate from the 1996 survey
of employers was 78 per cent of those contacted (Appendix Table A.1).
Approximately one year later, an attempt was made to re-interview the
2400 employers who participated in the 1996 survey.  Interviews were
achieved with 1490 of these employers in the 1997 survey.  For the 1999
survey, an attempt was made to re-interview employers who had been
interviewed in both 1996 and 1997.  This proved possible in 808 cases.
These re-interviewed employers are referred to as the ‘panel sample’.
They were spread quite evenly across the 12 evaluation areas, with about
70 employers in each.  The 1999 survey also involved interviews with a
new sample of employers from the evaluation areas.  This sample was
drawn from the same source and in accordance with the same principles
1.3  The samples
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as were used for the 1996 survey.  A further 1592 employers2  were
interviewed as part of this survey, so that the total number of interviews
carried out in 1999 was 2400.  The overall response rate from the 1999
survey of employers was 68 per cent of those contacted (Appendix, Table
A.1).
The survey of employers covered all industries but care was taken to
obtain a sufficient number of interviews in those industries within which
lower levels of pay are known to predominate.  If ETU has had any
effect on employers, then it is likely to have had its most pronounced
impact in these traditionally low-paid industries.  The survey was also
structured to provide an adequate representation of large as well as small
establishments.  Weights were constructed to allow an analysis of the
overall workforce and employment in three job groups (employment
basis) as well as upon the employing unit (establishment basis).  All tables
presented in this report are based on weighted data.  The weight applied
and hence the unit of analysis is shown at the bottom of each table and is
made clear in the text where necessary.
The survey of employers aims to investigate change in wage and
employment flows over the evaluation period and to explore how these
changes may be affected by employers’ perspectives of the benefit system,
and in particular ETU.  The design of the ETU evaluation is such that if
ETU does have any effect on employers’ behaviour then these differences
can be detected by comparing employers’ pre-ETU position with their
situation after the introduction of ETU, and by comparing employers in
the pilot areas (Scheme A and B areas) with employers in the Control
areas.  The panel sample is particularly well-suited to the analysis of changes
over the course of the evaluation period, while examination of the 1996
and 1999 cross-section surveys enables comparison of representative
snapshots of employers in the pre- and post-ETU periods.
The remainder of this report is structured as follows.  First, there is a
descriptive account of the employers in the 1999 sample, including their
wage and recruitment policies.  Then, the 1999 cross-section survey of
employers is compared, principally with the 1996 baseline survey (Marsh,
Callender, Finlayson, Ford, Green and White (1999), but also to a lesser
degree with the 1997 cross-section survey (Finlayson, Ford, Marsh, Smith
and White (2000).  The experiences of the panel sample are also explored
to investigate any changes over the course of the evaluation period.  Here,
the focus is on four key issues: workforce and recruitment; hours of
work; pay and the extent of low pay; and social security benefits, especially
ETU.  Multivariate analysis is then conducted to determine the net impact
of ETU.  Finally, the report draws on findings from the employers’ survey
to build a picture of the effects of ETU on employers’ behaviour.
1.4  Weighting
2 Inspection of the samples revealed that 35 members of the panel sample were also
sampled in 1999. These were in addition to the 1592 employers interviewed for the
first time in 1999, so the total size of the 1999 cross-sectional sample was 1627.
1.5  The analyses
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The majority of establishments (82 per cent) were in the private sector.
This varied by size of establishment and type of industry.  For example,
11 per cent of employers with two to four employees reported being in
the public sector compared with a fifth (20 per cent) of those with five or
more employees.
The industrial distribution of the employers surveyed in 1999 is shown
in Table 2.1.  A quarter of the sample (27 per cent) was located in
distribution industries.  A further 14 per cent were in hotel and catering
and 12 per cent were in manufacturing.  Fewer employers were in the
predominantly public sector industries, especially public administration
(only one per cent of establishments).
Table 2.1  Industrial distribution in 1999 by ETU area
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B Control All areas
Agriculture/mining/construction 5 9 5 7
Manufacturing/power/water 15 10 12 12
Distribution 27 29 24 27
Hotel/catering 16 12 13 14
Transport/communications 6 3 4 5
Finance/business services 8 9 10 9
Public adminstration 2 * 1 1
Education 6 7 9 7
Health/social services 7 9 11 9
Other services 9 11 11 10
Unweighted base 519 539 569 1627
Weight: establishment
Sixty-one per cent of the establishments interviewed in 1999 were
independent establishments, in that they did not form part of a larger
organisation.  A quarter of employers (27 per cent) were branches of a
larger organisation, while the remaining 12 per cent were the Head Office
of a larger group (Table 2.2).  A slightly greater proportion of employers
in the ETU control areas were independent establishments (65 per cent)
compared with employers in the pilot areas, especially Scheme A (57 per
cent).
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMPLOYERS IN 19992
2.1  Type of industry and sector
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Table 2.2  Type of organisation in 1999 by ETU area
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B Control All areas
Independent 57 62 65 61
Head Office 14 11 11 12
Branch 29 28 25 27
Unweighted base 519 539 569 1627
Weight: establishment
Employers in rural and seaside areas were less likely to form part of a
larger organisation compared with employers in urban areas.  For example,
two-thirds of employers in the rural and seaside areas reported being
independent establishments compared with half (51 per cent) in the major
urban areas.  Smaller establishments were also less likely to form part of a
larger organisation - 73 per cent of the smallest employers (two to four
employees) were independent establishments, compared with 35 per cent
of the medium-sized employers (50-99 employees) and 15 per cent of
the largest employers (200 or more employees).  Four out of every 10 of
the largest employers were the Head Office of a larger organisation.  The
type of organisation also varied by industry.  Not surprisingly, the great
majority of public administration employers (81 per cent) formed part of
a larger organisation, while employers in the agriculture/mining/
construction industries were the most likely to be independent enterprises
(87 per cent).
Table 2.3 shows the size of employer by the ETU area in which they
were located.3  There was little variation in the size distribution of
employers by area.
Table 2.3  Size of employer in 1999 by ETU area
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B Control All areas
2-4 employees 27 25 25 26
5-10 34 35 31 33
11-24 21 22 23 22
25-49 10 10 11 10
50-99 5 4 6 5
100-199 2 2 3 2
200 or more 2 1 2 2
Unweighted base 519 539 568 1626
Weight: establishment
2.2  The workforce
2.2.1  Number of employees
3 Despite the sampling strategy adopted, fewer small employers were interviewed than
the underlying population determined from the Census of Employment would have
suggested.  Thus, the sample was weighted to take into account the size of the employer.
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Independent establishments had smaller workforces, on average, than
employers who formed part of a larger organisation.  The former employed
an average of 31 workers (unweighted) compared with 62 employees in
branches of larger organisations and 111 employees in Head Offices.
Employers in ‘other services’ employed the fewest number of people (22
on average), while those in public administration employed the greatest
number (281).
Employers were asked in detail about employment in three relatively
low-paying job groups:
• Semi-skilled and unskilled employees.
• Skilled and craft employees.
• Clerical and sales employees.
Variations in the proportion of employees within each of these job groups
occurred most significantly in relation to industry, as shown by Table
2.4.  Employers in the hotel and catering industries had a predominantly
semi-skilled/unskilled workforce (57 per cent).  The agriculture/mining/
construction grouping had the highest proportion of skilled/craft
employees (41 per cent), while employers in distribution and public
administration each had a high proportion of their workforce made up of
clerical/sales employees (41 per cent).
Table 2.4  Average proportion of total employment in each
job group in 1999
Row percentages*
Semi and Skilled and Clerical Unweighted
Unskilled Craft and Sales base
Agriculture/mining/construction 23 41 13 87
Manufacturing/power/water 30 35 16 200
Distribution 21 17 41 325
Hotel/catering 57 13 8 325
Transport/communications 23 23 35 56
Finance/business services 9 25 34 115
Public administration 15 20 41 22
Education 22 21 14 142
Health/social services 36 23 21 146
Other services 35 28 14 208
All industries 29 23 24 1626
Weight: establishment
* The row percentages do not sum to 100 per cent since total employment includes other groups of
workers (professional, managers etc.)
Employers were also asked how many people they employed in
professional or technical jobs, or as senior administrators, supervisors and
managers.  These job groups were not seen as relevant to the ETU
evaluation since their incumbents are rarely low paid.  However, it
2.2.2  Job groups
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appeared that some employers had not included this group of workers in
their total employment calculations.  As was the case in 1997, additional
questions were added to the 1999 survey to try to adjust for this
discrepancy.  If the sum of those employed in the four job groups (semi/
unskilled; skilled/craft; clerical/sales; professional/technical) did not add
up to the total employment figures reported by the employer, then the
employer had the chance to adjust their initial calculations.  There was
also a follow-up question to check that employers had not missed out
their technical workers or managers from their figures altogether.  Table
2.5 shows how the total employment figures can be adjusted in this way.
On average, this adjustment made little difference to total employment
reported by employers, though it did in a number of cases.  To allow
valid comparability between the 1996, 1997 and 1999 surveys, calculations
are therefore based on the unadjusted figures, unless otherwise stated.4









Unweighted base 1627 1627
Weight: establishment
One of the primary objectives of the ETU pilot evaluation is to assess the
‘wage effect’ of the benefit.  The way in which pay levels are set and the
influences on this could partly determine, therefore, whether ETU has
any effect on wage offers.
Employers were asked about a range of influences on the levels of pay
offered in their establishment (Table 2.6).  More than half (55 per cent)
said it was ‘the pay individuals are willing to work for’ that influenced their
wage-setting behaviour.  If ETU allows sufficient numbers of people to
lower their reservation wage (the lowest wage for which they will work),
then there could be a knock-on effect in the rates of pay offered by
employers.  If individuals are willing to work for less, then employers
may correspondingly reduce their wage offers, even if they are themselves
unaware of ETU.
2.3  Wages
2.3.1  Factors influencing pay
levels
4 The fact that calculations were based on unadjusted figures does not impact on the
robustness of the analyses because the adjustments were so small.
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Table 2.6  Factors influencing levels of pay in 1999 by ETU
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B Control All areas
The pay individuals are willing
to work for 59 53 54 55
Pay offered by other local employers 50 38 40 42
National agreements and national
pay trends 46 39 42 42
The availability or scarcity of labour 41 35 36 38
Your own local negotiations
with trade unions 10 6 13 9
None of these/No answer 12 16 17 15
Unweighted base 519 539 569 1627
Weight: establishment
The second most influential influences on levels of pay were ‘the pay
offered by other local employers’ and ‘national agreements and national pay trends’,
both of which were mentioned by four out of 10 employers (42 per
cent).  In the case of the former, employers again need not be aware of
ETU for it to have an effect on their wage-setting strategies - they may
simply respond to the behaviour of other employers in their local labour
market.  The importance of national agreements and pay trends, however,
is less likely to lead to an ETU ‘wage effect’.  As it is only available in
eight areas, ETU is unlikely to have any effect on national pay trends,
while national agreements may act to prevent the wage reductions
necessary for an ETU ‘wage effect’.  Particularly salient in this regard is
of course the National Minimum Wage (NMW), which was introduced
about six months before the 1999 survey.5
Another way that ETU could have an effect on wage offers, however, is
by influencing the supply of labour. Four out of 10 employers (38 per
cent) said that ‘the availability or scarcity of labour’ had some influence on
the rates of pay they offered to employees. ETU may encourage more
people into the labour market by enabling them to accept lower wage
offers than would be the case without it.6
The most notable difference in pay determinants reported by employers
in ETU pilot and control areas related to the pay offered by other local
employers (Table 2.6). This was mentioned by half the employers in
Scheme A areas (50 per cent) but by only four out of 10 employers in
Scheme B and Control areas (38 and 40 per cent respectively).  Employers
5 The NMW was introduced in April 1999, while the survey was carried out from
August to November 1999.  The introduction of the NMW probably explains why
more employers in 1999 than in 1997 mentioned ‘national agreements and national
pay trends’ as important influences on their wage-setting behaviour (42 per cent
against 36).
6 The remaining factor said to influence employers’ pay levels, their ‘own local negotiations
with trade unions’, was mentioned by only one in 10 employers (9 per cent).
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in the seaside areas were most likely to report that the pay offered by
other local employers influenced their wage offers (48 per cent) and to
say that the availability or scarcity of labour was a factor (43 per cent).
The factors most likely to influence employers’ pay levels also varied
considerably by size of establishment.  Smaller establishments were more
influenced by the pay individuals are willing to accept compared with
larger establishments.  For example, 58 per cent of smaller employers
(two to 10 employees) said their wage offers were influenced in this way
compared with a third (35 per cent) of larger employers (100 or more
employees).  Conversely, larger employers were more influenced by the
pay offered by other local employers and local trade union negotiations
compared with smaller establishments.  Just over half (54 per cent) of
employers with 200 or more employees said that the pay offered by
other local employers influenced their pay, compared to less than four
out of 10 employers (37 per cent) with fewer than five employees.  Even
more strikingly, just under half (47 per cent) of these large employers
(200 or more employees)  mentioned local trade union negotiations as an
important factor, compared with only one in 20 (5 per cent) of employers
with two to 10 employees.
Differences in pay determinants also emerged when the public and private
sectors were compared.  Six out of 10 employers (58 per cent) in the
private sector said that the pay individuals are willing to work for
influenced their wage offers compared with four out of 10 employers (39
per cent) in the public sector.  Similarly, four out of 10 private sector
employers (41 per cent) said the availability or scarcity of labour was
important, compared with under a quarter (23 per cent) of those in the
public sector.  Public sector employers were more likely than private
sector employers to be influenced by national agreements and national
pay trends (65 versus 37 per cent) and local trade union negotiations (23
versus six per cent).
The influence of size and sector of employers on pay determinants is
reflected in the relationship between industry and the factors influencing
wage offers.  Public sector employers in public administration were the
most likely to follow national agreements and pay trends (91 per cent),
while their public sector counterparts in education were the least likely
to base their wage offers on the pay individuals are willing to accept (25
per cent).  Conversely, employers in mainly private sector agriculture/
mining/construction industries were the most likely to say they were
influenced by the pay individuals are willing to work for (73 per cent),
while their private sector counterparts in finance/business services were
the least likely to follow national pay trends and agreements (25 per
cent).
This discussion of pay determinants suggests there is quite considerable
scope for ETU to have a ‘wage effect’.  Of the three most common
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influences on levels of pay offered by employers, two of them - the pay
individuals are willing to work for and the pay offered by other local
employers - could allow ETU to have an effect through the workings of
the local labour market. The same can be said for the fourth most common
influence, the availability or scarcity of labour. However, it is also apparent
that the ability of ETU to have an effect on the pay offered by employers
is dependent on size of the employer, the sector within which it operates
and its industrial group.
Another factor that could influence the potential for ETU to have a
‘wage effect’ is the extent to which employers have wage policy autonomy
(Table 2.7).  This is a factor unique to the comparison-area design of the
ETU pilot evaluation since in a national implementation of ETU, Head
Offices would be faced with the same considerations as local branches.
Table 2.7  Wage policy autonomy in 1999 by ETU area
Column percentages
Scheme Scheme
All Branch A B Control
Independent 61 - 57 62 65
Head Office 12 - 14 11 11
Branch – pay rates decided by
management locally 5 20 6 6 4
Branch – pay rates agreed between
Head Office and local management 4 14 5 2 4
Branch – follow Head Office
procedure 18 66 18 19 16
Unweighted base 1613 525 515 534 564
Weight: establishment
More than six out of 10 (61 per cent) of the employers interviewed in
1999 were independent establishments in that they did not form part of
a larger organisation.  They would, therefore, have independence in
their wage-setting behaviour.  Likewise, one in 10 employers (12 per
cent) were Head Office branches so they would determine the wage
levels offered in their own establishment.  The remaining quarter of
employers (27 per cent) were branches of larger organisations.  Two-
thirds of them (66 per cent) had to follow Head Office procedure in
relation to the wages offered to new employees (Table 2.7).  Twenty per
cent of branches determined their wage offers locally and a further 14 per
cent negotiated their levels of pay with Head Office.
Overall, therefore, eight out of 10 employers (79 per cent) had local
autonomy to determine pay levels.  There would be scope, therefore, for
ETU to have an effect on the levels of pay offered in these establishments.
2.3.2  Wage policy autonomy
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Just under a fifth of employers (18 per cent) had to follow Head Offices’
procedures in pay determination, which would mitigate against an ETU
‘wage effect’ in the evaluation period, though perhaps not following a
national introduction of the benefit.
As was seen in Section 2.1, the type of area in which the employer was
located, the size of the employer and their industry group were all
associated with the independence of the establishment.  Employers in
rural and seaside areas were the most likely to be independent enterprises
and therefore most likely to have local autonomy over their wage-setting.
Conversely, employers in urban areas were the most likely to have to
follow Head Office wage-setting procedures.  There were no differences
between the ETU pilot and Control areas with regard to their degree of
wage policy autonomy (Table 2.7).
Smaller establishments were more likely to be independent concerns than
larger employers and just one in 10 (11 per cent) with two to four
employees had to follow Head Office wage-setting procedures.  This
compares with over a quarter (27 per cent) of medium-sized employers
(50-99 employees).  The largest employers were the most likely to
themselves be the Head Office branches of larger organisations, so had
greater independence in pay determination than some of the medium-
sized employers.  Public administration employers had the least local
autonomy in wage-setting, with 53 per cent having to follow Head Office
procedures in this respect.
This analysis would suggest, therefore, that small private sector
establishments based in rural and seaside areas would have the greatest
capacity to reduce their wage offers in response to ETU.  The wage
offers of these employers were more likely to be influenced by the pay
individuals were willing to accept.  Also, these employers were more
likely to have autonomy to set pay locally.  On the other hand, the wages
offered in larger public sector establishments located in urban areas would
be the least likely to be affected by the introduction of ETU.
The 12 areas included in the ETU pilot evaluation were selected partly
because they had above average unemployment and a high proportion of
low-wage occupations.  In addition to the potential wage effect following
the introduction of ETU, another possible outcome is the potential effect
ETU may have on employment.  If ETU allows some people to lower
their reservation wages and enter the labour market at wages they would
otherwise not have considered, then this may help to overcome
recruitment difficulties.  ETU may also have an effect on recruitment
through a ‘substitution effect’, whereby employers may target their




The capacity of ETU to effect recruitment via a ‘substitution effect’ is
partly dependent on employers’ autonomy in recruitment procedures
(Table 2.8).
Table 2.8  Recruitment policy autonomy in 1999 by ETU area
Column percentages
Scheme Scheme
All Branch A B Control
Independent 61 - 58 62 65
Head Office 12 - 14 11 11
Branch – procedure decided by
management locally 6 24 7 6 6
Branch – procedure agreed between
Head Office and local management 4 16 5 4 4
Branch – follow Head Office
procedure 16 60 16 17 15
Unweighted base 1616 528 518 538 566
Weight: establishment
Sixty per cent of branches of larger organisations had to follow Head
Office recruitment procedures.  A quarter (24 per cent) of branch
establishments could decide their recruitment procedure locally, while
one in six (16 per cent) negotiated their procedure with Head Office.
Overall, this means that eight out of 10 employers (80 per cent) had local
autonomy in their recruitment procedures, a proportion that showed no
significant variation across ETU pilot and Control areas.
The ETU Survey of Employers covered all industries and the sampling
procedure adopted ensured that an adequate representation of employers
in the traditionally low-paying industries, who are of particular interest
to the ETU evaluation, were included in the sample.  Small establishments
with under five employees were under-represented in the sample, which
was adjusted for in the weighting procedure.
The majority of employers (82 per cent) were in the private sector.  Sixty-
one per cent of those interviewed in 1999 were independent
establishments, in that they did not form part of a larger organisation, a
quarter were the branches of a larger organisation, while the remaining
12 per cent were the Head Office of a larger group.
Variations in the proportion of employees within each job group occurred
most significantly in relation to industry.  Employers in the hotel and
catering industries had a predominantly semi-skilled/unskilled workforce,
2.4.1  Recruitment policy
autonomy
2.5  The employers in 1999:
summary
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for example, while employers in distribution and public administration
each had a high proportion of their workforce made up of clerical/sales
employees.
Of the three most common influences on levels of pay offered by
employers, two of them - the pay individuals are willing to work for and
the pay offered by other local employers - could allow ETU to have an
effect through the workings of the local labour market.  The same can be
said for the fourth most common influence, the availability or scarcity of
labour.  The analysis showed that the potential for employers to reduce
wages in response to the new benefit would depend on their size, sector
and industry.  During the three-year period of the pilot, any potential
‘wage effect’ would also depend on the autonomy of the individual
employer to set pay locally.  Eight out of 10 employers had local autonomy
in this respect, again giving scope for a ‘wage effect’ in response to ETU.
The analysis suggests that small private sector establishments based in
rural and seaside areas would have the greatest capacity to reduce their
wage offers in response to ETU.  Conversely, the wages offered in larger
public sector establishments located in urban areas would be the least
likely to be affected by the introduction of ETU.
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This chapter compares the 1999 cross-section survey of employers with
the 1996 cross-section survey, and follows the experiences of the panel
during the study period.
Table 3.1 compares the distribution of the size of the employers in the
1996 and 1999 surveys.  There is little variation across most size categories,
except that the 1996 survey has a greater proportion of employers with
two to four employees, whereas the 1999 survey has more in the five to
ten employees category.  This is a result of the change in sampling strategy
described in Chapter 1.  A more substantial difference occurs in relation
to the mean number of employees where, on an unweighted basis, the
figure declines from 67 in 1996 to 51 in 1999.
Table 3.1  Size of employer in 1996 and 1999
Column percentages
1996 1999






200 or more 1 2
Unweighted mean 67 51
Unweighted median 16 17
Unweighted base 2398 1626
Weight: establishment
The left-to-right diagonal in Table 3.2 shows that just over half of the
panel sample of employers remained within the same size band (two-
thirds for the largest employers) between 1996 and 1999 and most of the
movement was confined to either the size category above or below.
CHANGES SINCE 1996 – A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS3
3.1  Workforce and recruitment
3.1.1  Size of employer
26
Table 3.2  Change in size of employer – panel sample
Column percentages
Size in 1999
2-4 5-10 11-24 25-49 50-99 100-199 200 or more
Size in 1996
2-4 55 19 5 2 2
5-10 34 60 25 5 3 2 3
11-12 7 17 55 29 6 5 9
25-49 1 2 13 50 16 2 2
50-99 1 1 11 56 25 3
100-199 1 1 1 4 18 53 18
200 or more 1 1 1 14 65
Unweighted base 76 169 203 123 110 59 66
Table 3.3 takes a more detailed look at the panel sample for the different
size categories.  As a percentage of their size in 1996, smaller employers
saw the greatest expansion of their workforce by the time of their third
interview.  Only the largest employers (200 or more employees) contracted
in size, on average.  Table 3.4 also focuses on the panel sample, but looks
at the mean differences in employment for each of the three main job
groups identified earlier.  Among the job groups where ETU would be
expected to have its greatest effect - semi/unskilled and clerical/sales -
there is mixed evidence regarding employment effects.  Levels of semi-
skilled and unskilled employment are maintained in the pilot areas, while
falling substantially in the Control areas.  In contrast, clerical and sales
employment shows better growth in the Control than in the pilot areas,
on average.
Table 3.3  Mean number of employees in 1996 and 1999 -
panel sample
Mean number of employees
Mean in 1996 Mean in 1999
Size band in 1996






200 or more 476 391
Unweighted base 808 808
No weight applied
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Table 3.4  Mean differences in size of employer within each
job group by ETU area - panel sample
Mean differences
Scheme A Scheme B Control All areas
Total employment + +3 -3 +
Semi/unskilled employment + + -4 -1
Skilled/craft employment -3 -3 -7 -4
Clerical/sales employment -2 +1 +3 +1
Unweighted base 239 270 265 774
No weight applied.
Thir ty-four employers with unreliable data on total employment were excluded from these analyses
As was suggested earlier, it may be expected that ETU would have an
effect on labour turnover.  Recruitment would be expected to increase
at the lower end of the wage distribution in response to ETU and some
employees may find they are able to stay in jobs longer because of the
new benefit, thereby reducing termination of employment.  Table 3.5
compares turnover of employment in 1996 and 1999 within each of the
three job groups.  Recruitment and termination rates were highest in
both years amongst semi/unskilled workers.  Recruitment rates were
considerably lower for semi/unskilled and clerical/sales employees in 1999
compared with 1996, but termination rates showed no such tendency to
change.
Table 3.5  Recruitment and termination of employment - all
employers
(as percentage of total employment in each year)
Mean percentages
Semi-/unskilled Skilled/Craft Clerical/Sales
1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999
Recruitment 48 39 26 26 31 16
Termination 31 32 15 16 17 14
Unweighted bases 1706 1181 1511 986 1646 1102
Weight: employment in each job group
Termination rates in semi/unskilled employment were indeed lower in
the ETU pilot than in the Control areas in 1999 (Table 3.6).  Whereas
termination rates in this job group were 42 per cent in Control areas,
they were 29 per cent in Scheme B areas and 26 per cent in Scheme A
areas.  Contrary to expectation, however, recruitment rates were also
lower for semi/unskilled employment in the pilot areas, running at 35
per cent in both Scheme A and Scheme B areas compared with 47 per
cent in the Control areas.
3.1.2  Turnover
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Table 3.6  Recruitment and termination of employment by ETU area in 1999
Mean percentages
Unweighted
base Scheme A Scheme B Control
Recruitment Termination Recruitment Termination Recruitment Termination
Semi/unskilled 1181 35 26 35 29 47 42
Skilled/craft 986 20 12 22 17 35 19
Clerical/sales 1102 17 14 18 15 15 12
About one in six employers in 1999 (17 per cent) reported a rapid turnover
of employees such that they had some jobs which they had to fill several
times a year.  Mostly this was in semi-skilled/unskilled jobs (74 per cent)
and less so within craft/skilled jobs (18 per cent) and clerical/sales jobs
(15 per cent).  A somewhat greater proportion of employers in Scheme
B areas said they had a high turnover of employment in some jobs (20
per cent) than in Scheme A and Control areas (15 per cent in each).
A higher proportion of employers based in seaside areas said they had a
rapid turnover of jobs (21 per cent), compared especially to major urban
areas (13 per cent).  Rapid turnover was also related to size of establishment,
with the proportion of employers who said they had to fill some jobs
several times a year varying from eight per cent in the smallest
establishments (two to four employees) to 32 per cent in medium-sized
establishments (25-99 employees).  A third of employers (37 per cent) in
hotel and catering industries reported rapid turnover in some job groups,
compared with only nine per cent in agriculture/mining/construction.
On the basis of self-reporting, twenty-six per cent of all employers in
1999 said that they had experienced difficulties in recruiting over the
past year, a similar proportion to 1996.  Among the panel sample, 41 per
cent of those who reported recruitment difficulties in 1996 were
continuing to incur such problems three years later.  Fourteen per cent
of these employers were experiencing recruitment difficulties in 1999
whereas they had not in 1996.
Among the panel sample, employers in the pilot areas were slightly less
likely to report recruitment difficulties in 1999 - 24 per cent in each
compared with 29 per cent in the Control areas.  However, there was no
evidence among the panel sample that ETU had eased recruitment
difficulties in the pilot areas compared with the Control areas (Table 3.7)
- 16 per cent of employers in the Control areas said they no longer
experienced recruitment difficulties by 1999, compared with 19 per cent
in Scheme A areas and 14 per cent in Scheme B areas.7
3.1.3  Recruitment difficulties
7 An investigation was carried out as to whether the reporting of recruitment problems
in the 1996 survey was associated with non-response to the 1997 and 1999 surveys,
but no clear findings emerged from this investigation.
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Table 3.7  Recruitment difficulties by ETU area - panel
sample
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B Control All areas
Both 1996 and 1999 11 12 11 11
1996 only 19 14 16 16
1999 only 13 12 18 14
Neither 1996 nor 1999 58 63 55 59
Unweighted base 253 281 274 808
Employers located in seaside areas reported the greatest difficulties in
recruitment in 1999 (32 per cent), whereas those in major urban areas
were least likely to have difficulties (19 per cent).  Recruitment difficulties
were also related to size of establishment, with the proportion of employers
who were reporting problems varying from 17 per cent in the smallest
establishments (two to four employees) to 35 per cent in medium-sized
establishments (50-99 employees).  A third of employers (36 per cent) in
health and social services reported recruitment difficulties, compared with
only three per cent in public administration.
The job groups to which employers experienced most difficulties
recruiting were the same in 1999 as they were in 1996.  A quarter of
employers in 1999 reported some difficulties recruiting clerical/sales staff
(29 per cent) but had more problems recruiting semi-skilled/unskilled
workers (43 per cent) and skilled/craft workers (45 per cent).
Entitlement to ETU begins at 16 hours per week and there is an extra
credit available to those who work for 30 or more hours per week.
Table 3.8 shows the typical weekly hours of work reported by employers
for their employees in the three main job groups.  In both 1996 and
1999, full-time semi/unskilled employees and clerical/sales workers
averaged 37 hours per week and skilled/craft workers averaged 38 hours
per week.
3.2  Hours of work
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Table 3.8  Hours of work by job type
Column percentages
Semi-/unskilled Skilled/Craft Clerical/Sales
1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999
1 to 15 hours
per week 18 23 4 5 15 15
16 to 29 hours
per week 17 22 8  10 17 24
30 or more hours
per week 65 58 88 84 68 61
100 100 100 100 100 100
Mean number of hours
per week (full-time) 37 37 38 38 37 37
Median number of hours
per week (full-time) 39 39 39 38 38 38
Unweighted base 1616 1171 1480 973 1591 1089
Weight: employment in each job group
There is modest evidence of a shift into the 16-29 hours per week category
amongst semi-skilled/unskilled employees and clerical/sales workers
between 1996 and 1999.  The proportion of semi-skilled/unskilled
employees working these hours rose from 17 per cent in 1996 to 22 per
cent in 1999, while the equivalent proportions for clerical/sales workers
rose from 17 per cent to 24 per cent.  Over the same period, these job
groups experienced a decline in the proportion of employees working
30 or more hours per week, from 65 per cent to 58 per cent in the case
of semi-skilled/unskilled employees and from 68 per cent to 61 per cent
in the case of clerical/sales employees.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show the distribution of weekly working hours in
the three job groups in 1996 and 1999 by ETU area.  There was some
quite marked variation in the weekly hours worked by employees by
ETU area.
Among semi-skilled/unskilled employees, there was an increase in part-
time working in Scheme B and Control areas between 1996 and 1999
and an associated decline in the proportion of employees working full-
time.  In Scheme B areas, the growth in part-time working was most
pronounced in the 16-29 hours category, which saw an increase from 18
per cent in 1996 to 23 per cent in 1999.  Growth of a similar order
occurred in the 16-29 hours category in Control areas, but these areas
saw more pronounced growth in the 1-15 hours category, where the
proportion of employees rose from 17 per cent in 1996 to 25 per cent in
1999.  In both Scheme B and Control areas the proportion of semi/
unskilled employees who worked 30 hours or more per week fell quite
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sharply from 1996 to 1999, a decline from 63 per cent to 54 per cent in
Scheme B areas and from 65 per cent to 52 per cent in Control areas.
No such decline took place in Scheme A areas, so that by 1999 the
proportion of semi/unskilled employees who worked full-time in these
areas (61 per cent) was higher than in Scheme B and Control areas.
The proportion of employees working 30 hours or more per week also
declined in Control areas in the case of clerical/sales employees, from 71
per cent in 1996 to 58 per cent in 1999.  This was due mainly to a shift
into the 16-29 hours category, which increased in these areas from 15
per cent of clerical/sales employees in 1996 to 26 per cent in 1999.  The
pattern of working hours for clerical/sales employees in pilot areas did
not change to any great degree during the evaluation period and the
proportion of such employees working 30 hours or more per week was
greater in Scheme A than in Control areas (66 versus 58 per cent).
Table 3.9  Hours of work in each job group by ETU area in 19968
Column percentages
Semi/unskilled Skilled/craft Clerical/sales
A B C A B C A B C
1-15 hours 20 19 17 7 5 4 13 16 14
16-29 hours 19 18 19 10 11 7 17 21 15
30+ hours 61 63 65 84 84 89 69 64 71
Unweighted base 535 564 586 477 506 518 539 544 556
Weight: employment in each job group
Table 3.10  Hours of work in each job group by ETU area in 1999
Column percentages
Semi/unskilled Skilled/craft Clerical/sales
A B C A B C A B C
1-15 hours 20 22 25 4 7 5 14 14 17
16-29 hours 19 23 23 11 11 9 19 25 26
30+ hours 61 54 52 85 82 86 66 60 58
Unweighted base 372 403 396 332 321 320 343 362 384
Weight: employment in each job group
Overall, therefore, the change in the pattern of weekly working hours in
each job group between 1996 and 1999 that could most readily be
interpreted as evidence of an ‘ETU effect’ is the maintenance of the
proportion of semi/unskilled employees and clerical/sales employees who
worked 30 hours or more per week in Scheme A areas.
8 In the column titles for Tables 3.9 and 3.10, A refers to Scheme A areas, B refers to
Scheme B areas and C refers to Control areas.
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Pay is one of the key elements of the ETU pilot evaluation because
eligibility for ETU depends on an individual’s net weekly income and
almost all workers within the scope of ETU will rely solely on wages for
their income, over and above their entitlement to other income-tested
benefits such as Housing Benefit.
The average gross hourly pay levels reported by employers varied by job
group.  Semi/unskilled workers were paid the least in 1999 at £4.67 per
hour.  Clerical/sales employees earned £5.35 per hour, while skilled/
craft workers were paid the most at £6.60 per hour (Table 3.11).  Semi/
unskilled and clerical/sales workers were paid more on average than they
had been in 1996, while craft/skilled workers were paid less.
Table 3.11  Average gross wage per hour by job group
1996 Base 1999 Base
Semi/unskilled £4.20 1521 £4.67 955
Skilled/craft £6.74 1290 £6.60 706
Clerical/sales £5.07 1328 £5.35 714
Weight: employment in each job group
As well as between job group, there was also variation in average hourly
wages by ETU area (Table 3.12).  Semi/unskilled workers in all three
areas were paid more in 1999, on average, than equivalent workers in
1996, but there was faster wage growth for this job group in pilot than in
Control areas.  Whereas the average pay of semi-skilled/unskilled workers
rose by 14 per cent in pilot areas during the evaluation period, it rose by
only six per cent in Control areas.
Skilled/craft workers were paid less, on average, in 1999 than equivalent
workers in 1996 in all the evaluation areas.  On the other hand, clerical/
sales employees in Scheme A and Control areas were paid more in 1999,
on average, while these types of workers in Scheme B areas were paid
about the same as they had been in 1996.  Semi/unskilled workers in
Control areas were paid the least in 1999 (£4.46 per hour) while skilled/
craft workers in Scheme A areas were paid the most in 1999 (£6.92 per
hour), on average.
Among those groups of workers upon whom ETU would be expected
to have its greatest effect, therefore, there is little evidence of an ETU
‘wage effect’ in the pilot areas compared with the Control areas between
1996 and 1999.  Indeed, semi/unskilled workers experienced more
substantial wage growth, on average, in the pilot as compared to the
Control areas.  The lack of average wage growth among clerical/sales
employees in Scheme B areas is the only finding that might be construed
an ETU ‘wage effect’.
3.3.1  Average gross hourly pay
3.3  Pay and the extent of low
pay
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Table 3.12  Average gross wage per hour in each job group by
ETU area
Scheme A Scheme B Control
1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999
Semi/unskilled £4.23 £4.81 £4.15 £4.71 £4.21 £4.46
Skilled/craft £6.93 £6.92 £6.51 £6.24 £6.74 £6.54
Clerical/sales £5.16 £5.73 £4.90 £4.89 £5.16 £5.52
Weight: employment in each job group
Employees in smaller establishments tended to be paid less per hour than
those working for larger employers, although the relationship was not
linear.  Taken together, however, job group and size of establishment led
to quite large differences in hourly rates of pay.  For example, skilled/
craft employees working in establishments with 200 or more employees
earned the most in 1999 at £7.78 per hour, while semi/unskilled
employees in establishments with 11-24 employees earned the least, on
average, at £4.06 per hour.
Average wages per hour also varied quite appreciably within each job
group by type of industry.  In 1996, workers in the hotel/catering industry
earned the least per hour compared with equivalent employees in other
industries for all types of workers.  The position in 1999 was only slightly
altered - hotels/catering had the lowest pay, on average, for semi/unskilled
workers at £3.75 per hour and for skilled/craft employees at £4.40 per
hour, but the distribution industries had the lowest pay for clerical/sales
workers, at £4.41 per hour on average.
Table 3.13 shows the mean differences in hourly wages (meaning the
average of 1999 wage minus 1996 wage) within each job group for the
panel sample.  If ETU has had a ‘wage effect’, then employers in the pilot
areas should have seen a smaller rate of increase in wage offers, or even a
decrease in wage offers, since 1996 compared with employers in the
Control areas.  There is some evidence consistent with this for semi-
skilled and unskilled workers, especially in Scheme B areas, where these
workers experienced an increase in average pay of £0.24 per hour (five
per cent) from 1996 to 1999, compared with £0.50 (12 per cent) in
Scheme A areas and £0.65 (16 per cent) in Control areas.  Clerical/sales
workers also experienced more limited wage growth in Scheme B areas
than elsewhere - their average pay rose by £0.17 per hour (4 per cent)
between 1996 and 1999, compared with £1.05 (21 per cent) in Scheme
A areas and £0.58 (12 per cent) in Control areas.  This suggestive evidence
notwithstanding, the independent effect of ETU on wage offers has to
be explored in more detail using multivariate techniques, holding all
other influences on wage offers constant in the analysis, to determine
with greater robustness whether ETU has had any impact on wage offers
(see Chapter 4).
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Even within the semi-skilled/unskilled group, the one most characterised
by low pay, an average of about £4 per hour (around £160 per week)
would leave most workers well above the levels of entitlement for ETU,
unless they worked very short hours.  But there was quite a wide
distribution of pay around this average, so attention was focused on the
proportion of workers paid £4 per hour or below.10
Semi/unskilled workers were the most likely to earn £4 per hour or
below, while only a negligible proportion of craft/skilled workers did so.
Overall, a third (35 per cent) of semi/unskilled employees earned £4 per
hour or below in 1999, as did one in ten clerical/sales workers (13 per
cent), but only one per cent of skilled/craft workers.  The overall
proportion of semi/unskilled employment earning £4 per hour or below
fell from 51 per cent in 1996 to 35 per cent in 1999.
The proportion of employees paid £4 per hour or below varied by ETU
area within each job group (Table 3.14).  In 1996, a higher proportion of
semi/unskilled employment in ETU Scheme B areas was low-paid (56
per cent) compared with employees in Scheme A and Control areas (47
and 51 per cent, respectively), but this was no longer the case by 1999,
when the proportion of semi/unskilled employment that was low-paid
had fallen to 32 per cent, a lower proportion than in the other evaluation
areas.  The proportion of clerical/sales employment that was low-paid
did not vary a great deal by evaluation area, but Scheme A areas had the
highest proportion of low-paid employment in this job group in 1996
(31 per cent) and Scheme B areas did so in 1999 (16 per cent).  Low-paid
employment was least common among craft/skilled workers in 1996 and
barely existed outside Scheme A areas by 1999.
Overall, therefore, the average proportion of employment in each job
group earning £4 per hour or below did not vary by evaluation area in
such a way as to provide evidence of an ETU ‘wage effect’.
Table 3.13  Mean differences in wage per hour by ETU area – panel sample9
Mean difference
Semi/unskilled Skilled/craft Clerical/sales
A B C A B C A B C
Mean difference £0.50 £0.24 £0.65 £0.46 £0.73 £0.06 £1.05 £0.17 £0.58
Unweighted base 159 162 165 111 132 140 116 134 148
Weight: employment in each job group
9 In the column titles for Tables 3.13 and 3.14, A refers to Scheme A areas, B refers to
Scheme B areas and C refers to Control areas.
10 £4 per hour was taken as the operational definition of ‘low pay’ because this enabled
us to ask employers questions relating to ‘those earning £4 per hour or below’ without
requiring employers to think about more precise and complicated definitions.
3.3.2  Low-paid employment
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Table 3.14  Average proportion of employment in each job group earning £4 per hour or
below by ETU area
Cell percentages
Semi/unskilled Skilled/craft Clerical/sales
A B C A B C A B C
1996 47 56 51 11 20 10 31 27 26
1999 35 32 38 12 6 6 12 16 11
The highest proportions of employees paid at a rate of £4 per hour or
below, corresponding to some extent with the pattern of variation in
average hourly rates examined earlier, were found in hotel and catering
industries in the case of skilled/craft employees (34 per cent paid £4 per
hour or below) and clerical/sales employees (51 per cent), but in other
services in the case of semi/unskilled employees (71 per cent).
Examining the proportion of employees paid at a rate of £4 per hour or
below on an establishment basis reveals that the underlying distribution
of employers is bi-modal, in the sense that most employers either had no
employees in each job group who they paid at a rate of £4 per hour or
below, or the majority of their employees (75 per cent or more) were
paid at this rate (Table 3.15).  For example, just under half of employers
in 1999 (46 per cent) said they paid none of their semi/unskilled workers
at a rate of £4 per hour or below, whereas four out of 10 employers (43
per cent) paid over three-quarters of their semi/unskilled workforce at
this rate.  Similarly, eight out of 10 employers (78 per cent) paid none of
their skilled/craft employees a rate of £4 per hour or below while one in
10 (13 per cent) paid the majority of their skilled/craft workforce (75 per
cent or more) at this rate.  The overall distribution of low-paid
employment was quite similar in 1996 and 1999, although the proportion
of employers paying none of their employees at a rate of £4 per hour or
below increased in each job group between 1996 and 1999, while the
proportion paying the majority of their workforce low pay declined in
each job group between these years.




1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999
Employment at £4/hour or below
0 30 46 71 78 56 70
1-24 3 3 2 3 5 4
25-49 4 4 4 3 4 3
50-74 6 5 4 3 5 3
75 or more 58 43 19 13 31 21
Unweighted base 1705 1171 1511 973 1646 1089
Weight: establishment
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The introduction of ETU may affect low-paid employment in a number
of ways.  The benefit may affect recruitment at the lower end of the
wage distribution, it may affect the wages offered to new recruits, or
other aspects of their conditions of employment, such as their hours of
work.  The survey of employers therefore asked specifically about recent
recruitment of workers paid at a rate of £4 per hour or below (about
£160 per week).  Overall, the proportion of employers recruiting at
these wage levels fell significantly between 1996 and 1999.  Of those
who had recruited in the last 12 months, six out of 10 employers (61 per
cent) in 1996 said they had recruited someone at a rate of £4 per hour or
below, while only four out of 10 employers (42 per cent) in 1999 reported
they had done so (Table 3.16).
Where employers had recruited at £4 per hour or below in the last 12
months, the majority (63 per cent) had recruited a similar number of
workers in this wage band as they had in the previous year, while 18 per
cent of employers said their recruitment at these wages had increased
over this period.
Table 3.16  Percentage of employers who had recruited
someone at £4 per hour or below in past year
Cell percentages
1996 Base 1999 Base
Scheme A 59 423 39 182
Scheme B 64 470 46 211
Control 61 467 42 210
All areas 61 1360 42 603
Weight: establishment
Table 3.17 looks at low-paid recruitment among the panel sample.  Just
under half of these employers (46 per cent) had recruited someone at a
rate of £4 per hour or below in both 1996 and 1999 but this proportion
did not vary a great deal across evaluation area.  Similarly, there was very
little difference between areas in the proportion of employers who had
newly recruited at these wages in 1999 only.  Again, this would suggest
that ETU had no effect on employers’ recruitment in the pilot areas
during the evaluation period.
Table 3.17  Low-paid recruitment by ETU area – panel
sample
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B Control All areas
Recruitment at £4 per hour or below in …
Both 1996 and 1999 42 48 47 46
1996 only 25 22 26 24
1999 only 8 4 8 7
Neither 1996 nor 1999 25 26 19 24
Unweighted base 192 218 218 628
3.3.3  Most recent low-paid recruit
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The largest employers (200 employees or more) were the least likely to
have recruited someone at £4 per hour or below in 1999, with only 18
per cent saying they had done so among employers who had carried out
some recruitment.  This compares with almost half (47 per cent) of
employers with 11-24 employees.  Employers in the hotel/catering
industries were the most likely to have carried out recent low-paid
recruitment, with 69 per cent having employed someone at £4 per hour
or less over the past year, followed by other services (54 per cent) and
distribution (50 per cent).  The industry groupings least likely to have
carried out recent low-paid recruitment were public administration (15
per cent) and education (11 per cent).
The average starting wage of employers’ most recent low-paid recruit
increased from £3.18 per hour in 1996 to £3.47 in 1999 (Table 3.18).
This wage growth was more limited in Scheme A areas than elsewhere,
rising from £3.24 per hour to £3.39 (an increase of five per cent),
compared with wage growth of 11 and 12 per cent respectively in Scheme
B and Control areas.  As expected, the starting wage paid to employers’
most recent low-paid recruit was heavily influenced by the National
Minimum Wage, introduced in April 1999.  Four out of 10 employers
(38 per cent) who recruited someone at £4 per hour or below in the past
year in 1999 did so at the adult minimum wage of £3.60 per hour (Table
3.19).  This proportion did not vary by evaluation area, but Scheme A
employers were more likely than those in other areas to pay their low-
paid recruits less than £3.60 per hour and less likely to pay them more
than £3.60 per hour (29 per cent, as against 41 per cent in Control
areas).  These findings are suggestive of an ETU ‘wage effect’ for low-
paid recruits in Scheme A areas.
Table 3.18  Mean hourly starting wage of most recent recruit
earning £4 per hour or below
1996 1999
Scheme A Scheme B Control All areas
Scheme A £3.24 397 £3.39 175
Scheme B £3.15 446 £3.49 196
Control £3.16 432 £3.53 198
All areas £3.18 1275 £3.47 569
Weight: establishment
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Table 3.19  Mean hourly starting wage of most recent recruit
earning £4 per hour or below (grouped) by ETU area in 1999
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B Control All areas
Less than £3.60 per hour 33 25 24 27
£3.60 per hour 39 39 35 38
More than £3.60 per hour 29 36 41 35
Unweighted base 175 196 198 569
Table 3.20 shows the mean differences between 1996 and 1999 in the
wages offered to the most recent low-paid recruits among the panel sample.
On average, new recruits were paid more in 1999 than equivalent workers
in the previous year in all areas.  The mean differences were somewhat
larger in Control than in pilot areas, providing further suggestive evidence
of an ETU ‘wage effect’.
Table 3.20  Mean differences in wage offers to most recent
low-paid recruits by ETU area - panel sample
Mean difference
Scheme A Scheme B Control All areas
Mean difference £0.35 £0.37 £0.41 £0.38
Unweighted base 83 113 105 300
Weight: establishment
Another of the aims of the ETU survey of employers is to determine
employers’ level of awareness and experience of social security benefits,
especially ETU.
There was an extremely high level of awareness of particular social security
benefits among employers in 1999 (Table 3.21).  Nearly all of them said
they had heard of Family Credit (96 per cent), Housing Benefit (95 per
cent) and Council Tax Benefit (87 per cent) and eight out of 10 said they
had heard of Disability Working Allowance (81 per cent).  As levels of
awareness had also been high in 1996, there was little scope for them to
increase over the course of the evaluation period.
3.4  Social security benefits
3.4.1  Awareness of specific benefits
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Table 3.21  Awareness of social security benefits
Column percentages, multiple response
1996 1999
Family Credit 95 96
Housing Benefit 97 95
Council Tax Benefit 87 87
Disability Working Allowance 75 87
None of these/no answer 1 2
Unweighted base 2400 1627
Weight: establishment
Employers were asked specifically if they were ‘generally aware if (in-work)
benefits are available to lower-paid workers’?  Most of them said they were
aware of the availability of in-work benefits and this level of awareness
rose from 76 per cent in 1996 to 84 per cent in 1999 (Table 3.22).
Levels of awareness were slightly higher in pilot compared with Control
areas.
Table 3.22  Awareness of in-work benefits by ETU area
(percentage who said they had heard of in-work benefits)
Cell percentages
1996 Base 1999 Base
Scheme A 77 626 85 451
Scheme B 74 620 85 464
Control 79 647 81 466
All areas 76 1893 84 1381
Weight: establishment
The proportion of employers who said they had heard of ETU increased
substantially from a third (33 per cent) in 1996 to over half (53 per cent)
by 1999 (Table 3.23).  The biggest increase in awareness was recorded in
Scheme B areas, where it doubled from 30 per cent in 1996 to 63 per
cent in 1999.  Awareness of ETU also increased considerably in Scheme
A areas, from 32 to 53 per cent over the course of the evaluation period.
These increases in awareness were, not surprisingly, greater than those
recorded in Control areas, but even these saw an increase from 35 per
cent in 1996 to 43 per cent in 1999.
3.4.2  Awareness of in-work
benefits
3.4.3  Awareness of ETU
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Table 3.23  Awareness of ETU by area
(percentage who said they had heard of ETU)
Cell percentages
1996 Base 1999 Base
Scheme A 32 258 53 269
Scheme B 30 251 63 347
Control 35 277 43 241
All areas 33 786 53 857
Table 3.24 shows that, among those employers who were aware of ETU
in 1999, four out of 10 (38 per cent) had first heard of it through informal
channels (‘other people’).  This method was particularly important in
pilot areas, where the ‘other people’ concerned were most commonly
employees.  About a quarter (26 per cent) of those employers who were
aware of ETU had first heard of it through a news item, usually a
newspaper/magazine article or TV news.  This method was particularly
important in Control areas, where the scope to learn about ETU through
informal channels was of course more limited.  Targeted advertising was
less effective, with only a fifth of employers (19 per cent) first hearing of
ETU through this method.  Amongst methods of advertising, newspapers
and magazines were more effective than posters or radio advertisements.11
Table 3.24  How employers heard of ETU in 1999 by ETU
area
(all who said they had heard of ETU)
Column percentages
Scheme A Scheme B Control
Advert 20 20 18
Other people 38 43 31
News item 25 24 30
Other 9 5 7
Don’t know 7 9 14
Unweighted base 269 347 241
Weight: establishment
While awareness of ETU increased during the course of the evaluation
period, knowledge of the eligibility criteria for ETU remained at quite a
low level.  Less than a fifth of employers in the pilot areas who had heard
of ETU (16 per cent in Scheme A areas and 19 per cent in Scheme B
areas) said they would be able to advise their employees on the number
of hours they would need to work to be eligible for ETU (Table 3.25).
11 The fact that 18 per cent of those employers in the Control sample who were aware
of ETU in 1999 claimed to have first heard of it through adverts, when no such
advertising was carried out in Control areas, means we must be cautious before attaching
particular weight to these findings.
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About the same proportion felt able to offer advice on whether or not an
employee would be eligible for ETU if they had dependent children and
slightly less said they would be able to offer advice to their employees on
the maximum they could earn and remain eligible for ETU.  Overall,
more than three-quarters of those employees in pilot areas who had heard
of ETU (79 per cent in Scheme A areas and 77 per cent in Scheme B
areas) said they would not be able to advise their employees on any of the
eligibility criteria and the proportion in Control areas was higher still.
This level of knowledge of the eligibility criteria for ETU is no higher
than it was in 1997.
Table 3.25  Advice on eligibility for ETU
(percentage of employers who were aware of ETU who could also
advise their employees on the following eligibility criteria)
Column percentages, multiple response
Scheme A Scheme B Control
Hours 16 19 15
Earnings 16 15 15
Children 18 17 13
None of these 79 77 82
Unweighted base 269 347 241
Weight: establishment
Overall, a third of employers (32 per cent) said they had experience of
their lower-paid workers being entitled to social security benefits in 1999
(Table 3.26).  This was slightly higher than had been the case in 1996.
The level of experience of social security benefits in 1999 did not vary by
ETU area.
Table 3.26  Experience of in-work benefits by ETU area
(percentage who said they had experience of in-work benefits)
Cell percentages
1996 Base 1999 Base
Scheme A 29 276 33 194
Scheme B 28 288 30 202
Control 32 311 34 227
All areas 30 875 32 623
Weight: establishment
Medium-sized establishments reported greater experience of in-work
benefits than smaller employers.  For example, 46 per cent of employers
with 25-49 employees reported experience of in-work benefits, compared
with 22 per cent of the smallest employers (two to four employees).  The
level of experience of in-work benefits also varied by industry.  Employers
in public administration reported the most experience of these benefits
3.4.4  Experience of social security
benefits
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(53 per cent) while those in agriculture/mining/construction reported
the least (18 per cent).
Of those employers who reported experience of their lower-paid workers
being entitled to in-work benefits, most (73 per cent) said they had
experience of Family Credit (Table 3.27).  This amounted to nearly a
quarter (23 per cent) of all employers.
Table 3.27  Experience of social security benefits in 1999
Column percentages, multiple response
Those with experience
All employers of in-work benefits
Family Credit 23 73
Housing Benefit 15 47
Council Tax Benefit 8 26
Disability Working Allowance 3 10
Don’t know 3 10
No experience 69 N/A
Unweighted base 1627 623
Overall, just five per cent of employers interviewed in 1999 reported
experience of ETU (89 cases in total) - four per cent in Scheme A and
eight per cent in Scheme B (Table 3.28).  Two per cent of employers in
the Control areas mistakenly reported experience of ETU (only 12 cases
in total)12.  A quarter of those employers in Scheme B areas (27 per cent)
who reported experience of in-work benefits also reported experience of
ETU.
Table 3.28  Percentage of employers reporting experience of




All employers Base in-work benefits Base
Scheme A 4 22 13 22
Scheme B 8 55 27 55
Control 2 12  5 12
All 5    89 15    89
Weight: establishment
3.4.5  Experience of ETU
12 The fact that some employers in Control areas mistakenly reported experience of
ETU raises the possibility, of course, that some employers in Scheme A and Scheme
B areas were also mistaken.
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The relatively greater experience of ETU in Scheme B areas is underlined
by the variations in reported experience of ETU across the eight pilot
areas.  For example, 10 per cent of employers in Sunderland and Doncaster
said they had experience of ETU, as did nine per cent in Bournemouth.
Thus, the three areas with the highest reported experience of ETU were
all in Scheme B.  It should also be pointed out however that the fourth
Scheme B area, Perth, shared with Southend the distinction of having
the lowest reported level of experience of ETU, at only three per cent of
employers.
Table 3.29 summarises employers’ levels of awareness and experience of
social security benefits, especially with regards to ETU.  General awareness
of in-work benefits rose between 1996 and 1999.  Nearly a quarter of
employers in 1996 (23 per cent) said they had not heard of in-work
benefits, falling to a sixth (16 per cent) in 1999.  The proportion saying
they had experience of in-work benefits, however, rose only marginally
in the evaluation period - from 30 to 32 per cent.  There was little
variation in the reported levels of awareness of in-work benefits by ETU
area in either year.
Awareness of ETU also rose quite substantially between 1996 and 1999.
Two-thirds of employers (67 per cent) said they were not aware of ETU
in 1996, but this had fallen to less than a half (47 per cent) by 1999.  The
change in levels of awareness was most marked in ETU Scheme B areas,
where lack of awareness halved from 70 to 37 per cent.  As with in-work
benefits as a whole, however, this greater awareness of ETU was not
accompanied by a large increase in experience of the benefit, which rose
from four per cent of employers in 1997 to five per cent in 1999, nor by
an increase in knowledge.
Table 3.29  Summary - awareness and experience of social
security benefits and ETU by ETU area13
Column percentages
1996 1999 1996 1999
A B C A B C All All
In-work benefits
Not aware 22 25 21 15 15 19 23 16
Aware, no experience 49 47 47 52 55 47 48 52
Experience 29 28 32 33 30 34 30 32
Earnings Top-up
Not aware 68 70 65 47 37 57 67 47
Aware, no experience 32 30 35 49 55 41 33 48
Experience N/A N/A N/A 4 8 2 N/A 5
Unweighted base 792 802 806 519 539 569 2400 1627
3.4.6  Summary of awareness and
experience of social security benefits
13 In the column titles for Table 3.29, A refers to Scheme A areas, B refers to Scheme B
areas and C refers to Control areas.
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The preceding analysis has provided a descriptive account of the key
changes in the characteristics and behaviour of employers during the
ETU evaluation period.
Among the job groups where ETU would be expected to have its greatest
effect - semi/unskilled and clerical/sales jobs - there was mixed evidence
regarding employment effects among the panel sample of employers.
Levels of semi/unskilled employment were maintained between 1996
and 1999 in the pilot areas but fell substantially in the Control areas, a
difference consistent with an ETU effect.  However, clerical/sales
employment grew more strongly in Control than in pilot areas, contrary
to expectation.
The findings on rates of recruitment and termination also provided mixed
evidence on ETU effects.  As expected, termination rates in semi/unskilled
employment were lower in the ETU pilot than in the Control areas in
1999. Contrary to expectation however, recruitment rates in this job
group were lower in the pilot areas compared with the Control areas.
There was no evidence that ETU had eased recruitment difficulties among
the panel sample of employers in the pilot areas compared with the Control
areas between 1996 and 1999.
A greater proportion of semi/unskilled employees and clerical/sales
employees worked 30 hours or more per week in Scheme A areas in
1999, compared especially with the equivalent workers in Control areas.
This difference was not apparent in 1996.
The descriptive analysis produced quite a lot of conflicting evidence with
regards to an ETU ‘wage effect’.
Semi/unskilled workers in the pilot areas were paid 14 per cent more on
average in 1999 than in 1996, whereas these types of workers in the
Control areas were paid only six per cent more.  However, there was no
wage growth among clerical/sales employees in Scheme B areas in the
evaluation period, whereas these types of workers experienced wage
growth in Scheme A and Control areas.
Among the panel sample of employers, wages grew more slowly for
semi/unskilled and clerical/sales workers between 1996 and 1999 in
Scheme B areas than in Scheme A or Control areas.
The underlying distribution of low-paid employment among employers
was bi-modal: either they had no employees in each job group who they
paid at a rate of £4 per hour or below or the majority of their employees
were paid at this rate.
3.5  Changes since 1996:
summary of the descriptive
analysis
3.5.1  Workforce and recruitment
3.5.2  Hours of work
3.5.3  Pay and the extent of low
pay
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The average proportion of each job group earning £4 per hour or below
in 1999 did not vary by evaluation area in such a way as to provide
evidence of an ETU ‘wage effect’.
Among the panel sample, there was very little difference between areas
in the proportion of employees who had newly recruited at wages of £4
per hour or below in 1999 only.
On average, recent low-paid recruits were paid more in 1999 than
equivalent workers in 1996 in all areas, but this wage growth was slower
in Scheme A areas than in Scheme B or Control areas.
Among the panel sample of employers, the average pay of recent low-
paid recruits rose more quickly between 1996 and 1999 in Control areas
than in pilot areas.
There was a high level of general awareness of in-work benefits among
the employers interviewed but less than a third (32 per cent) reported
actual experience of their lower paid employees being entitled to in-
work benefits.
Awareness of ETU increased between 1996 and 1999, especially in Scheme
B areas.  However, only six per cent of employers in the pilot areas
interviewed in 1999 reported any actual experience of ETU.  Knowledge
of the eligibility criteria for ETU was low even among those who said
they had heard of ETU and was no higher than it had been in 1997.
3.5.4  Social security benefits
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The descriptive analyses outlined above have offered some evidence of
an ETU effect, albeit one which does not appear consistently.  Multivariate
analyses, which control more systematically for differences between
employers, provide a more robust test of whether ETU has affected pay
or employment in the hypothesised manner.
Multivariate analyses were restricted to the panel sample, because we had
data for these employers relating both to the time before the introduction
of ETU (1996) and the end of the evaluation period, when any changes
in outcomes or behaviour brought about by ETU could be assumed to
be maximised (1999).  The multivariate analyses examine differences
between the values of certain key variables in 1996 and 1999 and estimate
the extent to which these differences can be explained by ETU.  They
involve, therefore, the construction of ‘difference models’.
Changes associated with the introduction of ETU are most likely to be
seen in establishments where there is already a high proportion of low-
waged work and considerable labour turnover.  Any change in wage
offers would also be more likely for new rather than existing jobs.  The
potential for ETU to impact on wage offers might therefore have an
effect on the proportion of low-paid employment within particular job
groups.  Given that entitlement to ETU begins at 16 hours per week and
that there is an extra credit available to those who work for 30 hours or
more per week, it might also be expected that ETU would encourage a
greater proportion of employees to work these hours than was the case
before the benefit’s introduction.
Based on these assumptions, multivariate analyses were undertaken to
explore in detail five areas where ETU might have been expected to
have an impact:
• Change in hourly wages.
• Change in the percentage of low-paid employment.
• Change in hourly wages of the most recent low-paid recruit.
• Change in weekly working hours.
• Change in the speed and difficulty of recruitment.
In the case of each area of analysis, difference models were constructed
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression.  It was possible to use
OLS because in each case we had a continuous measure of the dependent
variable requiring explanation (for example, change in wages between
1996 and 1999).  The technique involves estimating the extent to which
variation in the dependent variable is associated with variation in a number
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ETU – MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES4
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of explanatory variables that are included in the model.  The technique is
able to identify the independent impact of each of the explanatory (or
predictor) variables on the dependent variable, holding constant the effect
of the others.
The explanatory variables used in the models were of two broad types.
First, there were fixed variables, which took a value determined prior to
the evaluation period.  An example of such a variable would be the size
of establishment in 1996.14  Second, there were change variables, whose
value altered during the course of the evaluation period.  The change in
the proportion of employees in a particular job group between 1996 and
1999 who were female would be an example of a change variable.  The
most important change variable, however, was of course the introduction
of ETU.
Explanatory variables were retained in the reported versions of each model
if they were statistically significant, or if they were part of a group of
variables of which some of the members were significant.  It did not
prove possible to explain changes in weekly working hours and the speed/
difficulty of recruitment, so reporting is confined to models on the change
in hourly wages, change in the percentage of low-paid employment and
change in hourly wages of the most recent low-paid recruit.
The models were run separately for the job groups in which ETU is
likely to have its most noticeable impact - semi/unskilled and clerical/
sales employees.  The results of this estimation for semi-skilled/unskilled
employment are shown in the appendix, Table 2.
Of necessity, this model was restricted to those employers who reported
a level of average gross hourly pay for semi/unskilled employees in both
1996 and 1999.  Once employers were also excluded if they had missing
values on any of the control variables, the model was computed for 385
members of the panel sample.  As this model estimated the impact of
ETU on the change in wages of semi/unskilled employees, it was weighted
by employment in that job group at the beginning of the evaluation
period.  The adjusted R² for the model was 0.43, which indicates that it
was able to explain 43 per cent of the change in hourly pay of semi/
unskilled employees that occurred between 1996 and 1999, a satisfactorily
high proportion for this type of exercise.
Among fixed variables, the average gross hourly wage of semi/unskilled
employees in 1996 and the size of establishment in that year had the most
explanatory power.  While larger establishments saw faster wage growth
4.1  Change in hourly wages of
semi/unskilled and clerical/sales
employees
14 The use of ‘prior’ variables in this way introduces the danger that standard errors will
be distorted and t values inflated by serial correlation (Gujarati, 1992, 1995).  This was
tested for in each of the econometric models by computing and inspecting the Durbin-
Watson statistic, which in each case suggested that the models were not affected by
serial correlation.
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for semi/unskilled employees between 1996 and 1999, the opposite was
the case for those establishments in which wages were already high in
1996.  This latter effect is due to the National Minimum Wage - the
wage growth in establishments that already paid above £3.60 in 1996
was unsurprisingly slower than in establishments that had to meet the
requirements of the legislation.
Among change variables, an increase in the number of semi/unskilled
workers employed by the establishment between 1996 and 1999 was
associated with an increase in average pay for that job group.  Wages
tended to be higher where wage-setting was influenced by the supply of
labour in 1999 but not in 1996, but lower where national agreements or
pay trends were important in 1999 but not in 1996.
The variables indicating whether the employer was located in a Scheme
A pilot area or a Scheme B area, as opposed to the Control areas, were
not significant in this model, indicating that ETU had no impact on the
change in wages of semi-skilled/unskilled employees between 1996 and
1999 (the appendix, Table 2).
The appendix, Table 3 shows the results of the model that explained the
change in the average hourly wages of clerical and sales employees between
1996 and 1999.  This model had an adjusted R² of 0.51, which meant it
was able to explain most of the wage change that occurred for clerical/
sales employees during the evaluation period.  The model was restricted
to the 277 employers with valid data and was weighted by employment
in the clerical/sales job group in 1996.
The average wage of clerical/sales employees at the beginning of the
evaluation period again had a pronounced negative effect on 1996-99
wage growth.  The proportion of clerical/sales employees who worked
part-time (less than 30 hours per week) in 1996 also exerted downward
pressure on wages.  Among change variables, an increase between 1996
and 1999 in the proportion of clerical/sales employees who were female
reduced wage growth, as did an increase in the proportion of such
employees who worked part-time.  Conversely, increased product or
service demand was associated with an increase in the average wage levels
of clerical/sales employees.
As was the case with semi/unskilled employees, ETU had no effect on
the change in wages of clerical/sales employees between 1996 and 1999.
Where employers had become aware of ETU by 1999, however, whereas
they had not been aware in 1996, this was associated with the payment of
lower wage increases to clerical/sales employees.  This suggests that where
employers show increased awareness of ETU, the benefit is more likely
to restrain wage growth.
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If ETU had exerted a ‘wage effect’ this should be manifested in an increase
in the proportion of low-paid employment within the semi/unskilled
and clerical/sales job groups in the pilot relative to the Control areas.
The appendix, Table 4 shows the model results for the change between
1996 and 1999 in the proportion of semi/unskilled employees who were
paid at a rate of £4 per hour or below.  Just over half of the panel sample
(454 employers) employed some semi/unskilled workers at these wage
levels in both 1996 and 1999 and provided valid data for all the other
variables contained in the model.  The model had a reasonably high
adjusted R² of 0.43, which indicates that it was able to explain 43 per
cent of the change in the proportion of low-paid semi/unskilled
employment that occurred between 1996 and 1999.  It was weighted by
employment in the semi/unskilled job group at the beginning of the
evaluation period.
Among fixed variables, the proportion of semi/unskilled workers who
were paid £4 per hour or below in 1996 exerted a strong downwards
influence on the change in this proportion over the course of the evaluation
period.  This can again be related to the National Minimum Wage
introduction, with employers heavily dependent on low-wage labour
having little scope to increase this dependence during a period in which
statutory wage protection was re-introduced.  The size of establishment
in 1996 also had a pronounced negative effect, but where employers
were operating in the traditionally low-paying hotel/catering industries
and other services, they reduced their reliance on low-paid labour within
the semi/unskilled job group less rapidly than was the case in other
industries.  Where employers said that national pay trends and national
agreements were important in wage-setting in 1996 but not in 1999, this
was associated with an increase in the proportion of semi/unskilled
employees who were low-paid.  This was the most important change
variable.
ETU had no effect on the change between 1996 and 1999 in the
proportion of semi/unskilled employees who were low-paid.  Increased
awareness of ETU, however, was again associated with a change consistent
with theoretical expectations - where employers were aware of ETU in
1999 whereas they had not been in 1996, this was associated with an
increase in the proportion of low-paid employment with in the semi-
skilled/unskilled job group.
With an adjusted R² of 0.56, the OLS model that explained the change
in the proportion of low-paid clerical/sales employment between 1996
and 1999 had a high degree of explanatory power (the appendix, Table
5).  The model was computed for the 465 members of the panel sample
who employed clerical/sales employees for whom they provided wage
data in both 1996 and 1999 and who also had valid data for each of the
variables included in the model.  It was weighted by clerical/sales
employment in 1996.
4.2  Change in the proportion
of low-paid semi/unskilled and
clerical/sales employment
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The proportion of clerical/sales employees who were low-paid in 1996
was the most powerful fixed variable in the model and had a negative
effect on the dependent variable.  The proportion of clerical/sales
employees who were part-timers in 1996 was strongly associated with an
increase in the proportion of such workers who were low-paid between
1996 and 1999, a finding which mirrors the importance of the same
variable in the wage change model (see the appendix, Table 3).  Amongst
change variables an increase in the proportion of the clerical/sales workforce
who worked part-time was associated with an increase in the proportion
of such workers who were paid at a rate of £4 per hour or less.  The
same was true if wage-setting was influenced by the pay individuals were
willing to accept in 1999 but not in 1996.
ETU had no effect on the change in the proportion of low-paid clerical/
sales employment between 1996 and 1999.  Increased awareness was
again associated with an increase in the proportion of low-wage
employment, although in this case it was increased awareness of in-work
benefits in general rather than ETU in particular that was important (the
appendix, Table 5).
Further models were constructed to try to detect whether ETU had any
effect on the wages offered to new recruits.  The appendix, Table 6
shows the results for the model measuring the influences on the change
in wage offers to employers’ most recent low-paid recruit between 1996
and 1999.  Just over a third of employers in the panel sample (300) had
recruited an employee at wages of £4 per hour or below in both 1996
and 1999 and had valid data on all of the variables included in the model.
This model had an adjusted R² of 0.53, which meant it was able to
account for more than half of the variation in the dependent variable.
Information was not collected on the job group of the most recent low-
paid recruit, so this model was weighted by employment as a whole in
1996.
Among fixed variables, the wage level of the most recent low-paid recruit
in 1996 had the largest effect on wage growth for this type of employee
over the course of the evaluation period.  The explanation for this is the
same as for similar findings in the earlier models and relates to the impact
of the National Minimum Wage, which ensured that wage growth
amongst employers who paid less than £3.60 per hour to their most
recent low-paid recruit in 1996 was faster than for those who paid more.
Wage growth in relation to the most recent low-paid recruit was also
constrained in production industries and other services.
Of the change variables, those relating to wage-setting had the most
impact on the change in wages of the most recent low-paid recruit.
Where employers reported that the pay individuals were willing to work
for was an important factor in 1996 but not in 1999, this was associated
with slower wage growth than was the case otherwise.  Conversely, if
4.3  Change in hourly wages of
most recent low-paid recruit
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employers said that the supply of labour was important in 1996 but not
in 1999, this was associated with relatively fast wage growth.
A major distinction between this model and those reported above was
that the change in hourly wage offers to the most recent low-paid recruit
between 1996 and 1999 was subject to an ETU effect.  After controlling
for other variables influencing wage change, employers located in Scheme
B areas reported slower wage growth than was the case in Control areas.
This is the type of effect ETU would be expected to have if the benefit
was making low-paid work more attractive for eligible employees.  There
was no such effect in Scheme A areas.  Awareness of ETU and in-work
benefits in general was also associated with slower wage growth, albeit
not strongly15.  If employers were aware of ETU in 1999 having not
been in 1996, hourly wage offers to the most recent low-paid recruit
rose more slowly than was otherwise the case.  The same was true if
employers became aware of in-work benefits in general during the course
of the evaluation period.
The main reason why an ETU effect applied to the change in hourly
wage offers to the most recent low-paid recruit but not to other outcome
variables is probably because it is easier for employers to change the
wages offered to new workers than to existing staff.16
It proved possible through multivariate analysis to explore in detail three
areas where ETU might have been expected to have an impact:
• Change in hourly wages.
• Change in the percentage of low-paid employment.
• Change in hourly wages of the most recent low-paid recruit.
The five econometric models that were used to estimate the impact of
ETU in these areas were able to explain a satisfactorily high proportion
of the variation in each dependent variable and satisfied other criteria for
robustness and reliability.  They suggested that ETU had no impact on
change in hourly wages or in the percentage of low-paid employment,
4.4  Assessing the impact of
ETU: summary of multivariate
analysis
15 The coefficients on the AWARE and AWAREETU variables were only significant
at the 90 per cent confidence level.
16 The possibility was also considered that the employers who had recruited low-paid
employees in both 1996 and 1999 were a non-random subset, rendering the results of
this model ungeneralisable to the panel sample as a whole.  This was tested for by
constructing a probit model that identified the employer characteristics associated
with recruiting low-paid workers in 1996 and 1999 and then inserting the inverse
Mills’ ratio (8) from this model into the OLS model explaining change in hourly
wages of the most recent low-paid recruit.  This is the established method for detecting
and correcting for sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). The 8 variable was non-
significant in the model, indicating that sample selection bias was not present and that
the results are generalisable to the population.
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but that increased awareness of ETU was associated with suppressed wage
growth in the case of clerical/sales workers and with an increase in the
proportion of low-paid semi-skilled/unskilled workers.  A discernible
ETU effect was found in relation to the change in hourly wages of the
most recent low-paid recruit, with employers in Scheme B areas registering




The survey of employers set out to assess the impact of ETU on employers’
behaviour.  A number of outcomes following the introduction of the
new benefit might be expected: lower wages, higher employment rates
and the creation of new jobs; a change in employment policy; and an
increase in awareness of in-work benefits.
Among the job groups where ETU would be expected to have its greatest
effect – semi/unskilled and clerical/sales jobs - there was mixed evidence
regarding employment effects among the panel sample of employers.
Levels of semi/unskilled employment were maintained between 1996
and 1999 in the pilot areas but fell substantially in the Control areas, a
difference consistent with an ETU effect.  However, clerical/sales
employment grew more strongly in Control than in pilot areas, contrary
to expectation.  There was no evidence that recruitment difficulties had
eased following the introduction of ETU.
Awareness of in-work benefits was high, although less than a third of
employers reported any actual experience of these benefits.  Awareness
of ETU rose between 1996 and 1999, especially in Scheme B areas,
though only six per cent of employers in the pilot areas reported any
experience of ETU by 1999.
Of the three most common influences on the levels of pay offered by
employers, two of them - the pay individuals are willing to accept and
the pay offered by other local employers - give considerable scope for an
ETU ‘wage effect’.  No such effect emerged clearly from the descriptive
analysis, however, which instead produced a lot of conflicting evidence.
For example, while among the panel sample of employers wages grew
more slowly for semi/unskilled and clerical/sales workers between 1996
and 1999 in Scheme B areas than in Scheme A or Control areas, the
average proportion of each job group earning £4 per hour or below in
1999 did not vary by evaluation area.  The one area in which the
descriptive evidence was a little more consistent was in relation to recent
low-paid recruits.  Thus, analysis of the cross-section surveys showed
that recent low-paid recruits were paid more in 1999 than equivalent
workers in 1996 in all areas, but this wage growth was slower in Scheme
A areas than in Scheme B or Control areas and, among the panel sample,
the average pay of recent low-paid recruits rose more quickly between
1996 and 1999 in Control areas than in pilot areas.
The multivariate modelling produced limited evidence of an ETU effect
on wages.  There was no evidence of an ETU effect on change in hourly
wages of clerical/sales and semi/unskilled employees between 1996 and
CONCLUSIONS5
5.1  Employment and new jobs
5.2  Employment policy
5.3  Wages
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1999, nor on the change in the proportion of employees in these job
groups who were low-paid.  But in relation to the change in wages of
the most recent low-paid recruit a clear ETU ‘wage effect’ did emerge,
albeit only in relation to Scheme B areas, where wage growth was slower
for recent low-paid recruits than in Control areas.
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6 EARNINGS TOP-UP AND THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS
One of the main arguments for an in-work benefit such as Earnings
Top-up (ETU) is that it would increase the incentive of jobseekers to
accept job opportunities at the lower end of the wage distribution.  The
result would be to increase competition for low-paid jobs.  In the absence
of a mechanism (such as a wage reduction) for inducing employers to
increase the number of jobs on offer, the net impact of ETU on
employment might be expected to be small and mainly at the expense of
other job seekers17.  Such a view, however, overlooks the dynamic aspects
of the jobs market.  At any moment, a proportion of jobs remains unfilled
(vacancies) while employers seek to match the job vacancy to a suitable
recruit.  In some instances, vacancies remain unfilled because they only
offer low pay.  Insofar as ETU increases the incentive to take low-paid
jobs, employers may find that they can fill vacant jobs more quickly than
hitherto and can recruit to jobs previously ‘hard to fill’.  Where this
happens, the average time taken to fill vacancies will fall and the proportion
of total jobs occupied will increase.  There may thus be some scope for
an increase in employment despite the overall number of jobs remaining
unchanged.
In order to establish whether there are any wider labour market effects
arising from the introduction of ETU, it is essential to examine employer
behaviour, particularly behaviour relating to vacancies and recruitment,
before and after the introduction of the benefit and also to compare
employer behaviour in ETU pilot areas and in the Control or Comparison
areas.  This report presents the findings of research relating to these
important indicators of the impact of ETU on the labour market.
The aim of the research was to establish the impact of ETU on the
recruitment process.  More specifically, the research examined three
research questions.  These were:
• Was there any evidence of change over time in the structure of vacancies
in the ETU pilot areas compared to the Control areas?
• Were the number of vacancies, especially ‘hard to fill’ vacancies, lower
in the ETU pilot areas after the introduction of ETU, and in comparison
to the Control areas?
• Had the durations of unfilled vacancies become shorter since the
introduction of ETU or were unfilled vacancy durations shorter in
ETU pilot areas than in the Control areas?
6.1  Introduction
6.2  Aim and objectives of the
research
17 Conventionally, such effects are described as substitution and displacement effects
(see Hasluck 1998 for a description of these potential effects).  Briefly, ‘substitution’
would have arisen if ETU-subsidised workers were employed at the expense of non
ETU-subsidised workers.  ‘Displacement’ is similar but work via competitive forces
through the markets for goods and services.
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Employers with jobs to fill can be thought of as ‘searching’ for acceptable
recruits from amongst the many jobseekers in the labour market.
Acceptable recruits are those who meet the employer’s hiring standard.
A wide range of factors influence the acceptability of jobseekers to an
employer.  Such factors include characteristics such as attitude, previous
experience, skills and so forth.  However, a willingness to work for the
wage on offer must also be a necessary characteristic if a potential recruit
is to be successfully hired.  In the case of employers offering low-skill and
low wage jobs, the lowest wage at which the jobseeker would accept a
job (the reservation wage) may be the most important consideration,
subject to some minimum standard of attitude and motivation.  This is
particularly so where an employer cannot increase the wage on offer
because the job is of low value-added, the enterprise is operating in a
very competitive product market with low margins, or because of
collective wage agreements or other conventions preventing individual
wage flexibility.  In these circumstances employers will search at the
extensive margin of the labour market, using whatever recruitment
channels are available, with the objective of finding as many potential
recruits as possible in the hope of finding someone willing to work for
the (low) wage on offer.
The probability that an employer will find a recruit in any period of time
will depend on the number of jobseekers looking for work, how many
of them would be prepared to accept the wage offered18, the recruitment
methods used and the intensity of their use.  In some instances the
employer will have set such a low wage that the vacancy will remain
permanently unfilled because no ‘acceptable’ (i.e. willing to accept the
wage on offer) recruit can be found by the employer.  In other instances,
the wage offered may be such that only a very few jobseekers would
accept it and the employer will have to undertake many searches to find
such recruits and to hire them.  The length of time that a vacancy remains
unfilled (the vacancy duration) will thus be determined by factors such as
local labour supply conditions, the costs of search and levels of out-of-
work benefits (which affects the lowest acceptable, or reservation, wage)
and employers’ demand for labour (the productivity of labour and the
wage on offer), the cost of keeping the vacancy unfilled and the alternative
recruitment channels open to the employer.
By reducing the lowest acceptable wage of jobseekers, in-work benefits,
such as ETU, have the effect of shifting the labour supply function facing
employers.  By ‘topping up’ earnings, ETU allows jobseekers to accept
jobs at wage levels which they would have considered unacceptable
without the benefit19.  ETU shifts the labour supply function ‘to the
6.3  In-work benefits and the
recruitment process
18 In technical terms, this refers to the distribution of ‘reservation wages’ amongst
jobseekers.  The reservation wage is the lowest wage at which a person would be
prepared to accept employment.
19 Surveys of low-paid workers and the unemployed have shown that ETU would create
a positive work incentive for most low-paid households (Marsh, Ford and White,
1998).
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right’ by reducing reservation wages at the lower end of the distribution.
This suggests that ETU could have an impact upon the number and
duration of unfilled vacancies.  For any particular vacancy, especially
those for which a willingness to work at low pay is the most important
requirement, employers will encounter ‘acceptable’ recruits more
frequently than was the case before the introduction of ETU.  This will
raise the probability of a successful hire from any given search activity
and this, in turn, will reduce the expected or average duration of unfilled
vacancies.
Any reduction in the average duration of unfilled vacancies will be reflected
in a reduction in the number of such vacancies and, by implication, an
increase in the level of employment20.  The reduction in the number of
vacancies is a reflection of the increased proportion of total jobs actually
filled.  This represents an improvement in the effectiveness with which
the jobs market operates (although not necessarily in its efficiency).  The
fall in the stock of vacancies represents the net employment gain from
ETU.  How large this net gain is in reality depends on the extent to
which there are significant numbers of vacancies remaining unfilled for
lack of people willing to work for the wage on offer and the extent to
which ETU increases the incentive for jobseekers to accept such jobs.
Reductions in the average duration of vacancies could be temporary if
employers respond to the changed recruitment conditions.  If employers
find it easier than previously to recruit, this may temporarily reduce the
time that vacancies remain unfilled.  However, such a deviation from
normal experience may signal to employers that the labour market is
more competitive and they may react to such untypical, and possibly
unexpected, success in recruiting workers.  Employers may have in mind
an acceptable time to fill a vacancy based upon the costs of recruitment
and the costs of leaving a job unfilled.  If so, their response to greater
success at recruiting may be to reduce the wage on offer (or to raise their
hiring standards in other ways).  As this would reduce the arrival rate of
suitable recruits, raise the duration of unfilled vacancies and, in turn,
raise the number of unfilled vacancies back to the level that existed prior
to the introduction of ETU.  The impact of ETU on vacancy duration
could thus be transitory.  Indeed, changes in recruitment activity and
vacancy duration could be the mechanisms which induce increases in the
number of jobs by triggering wage reductions that result in an increase in
the demand for labour and increased employment.
20 As the number (or stock) of unfilled vacancies when the job market is in a ‘steady






is the mean duration of an unfilled vacancy and
I
v
 the flow of new vacancies onto the labour market, it follows that a reduction in D
v
will reduce the number of vacancies observed with any given level of vacancy inflow
and this implies an increase in the level of employment.
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The research used two main sources of data.  These were:
• Vacancies notified to the Employment Service.
• The 1996 and 1997 ETU Employer Surveys.
Data on vacancies notified to the Employment Service were available for
the 12 ETU pilot and Control areas (using approximations based on
Jobcentre Office areas).  The vacancy data consisted of monthly and
quarterly series that could be accessed via NOMIS21.  The quarterly series
were particularly important because they provided information about
vacancies by industry, occupation and median duration.  In general, the
series were available for vacancies notified (vacancy inflow), unfilled
vacancies (vacancy stock), vacancies filled and vacancy outflow (the latter
being vacancies filed plus vacancies cancelled).  The median duration of
vacancies by occupation and industry provided information about the
length of time that unfilled vacancies had been on the books of the
Employment Service and allowed vacancies that were ‘hard to fill’ to be
identified.
However, in general, it is important to bear in mind some shortcomings
of ES vacancy data.  The main disadvantage of the ES notified vacancy
series was the partial coverage of notified vacancies.  Overall, the 1992
Employers’ Recruitment Practices Survey (ERPS) suggested that between
half and one third of all vacancies were notified to the Employment
Service (Hales, 1993).  However, this problem may have been less serious
in the case of vacancies for low-paid jobs than for other types of job.
According to the ERPS, around 35 per cent of engagements involving
pay of less than £4 per hour were notified to a Jobcentre, compared with
only 19 per cent of jobs paying more than £4 per hour.  Amongst people
recruited from unemployment, the corresponding figures were 44 per
cent and 27 per cent.
It is widely recognised that a disproportionately high share of vacancies
notified to the Employment Service nationally was for unskilled jobs,
semi-skilled jobs in general and skilled manual and craft jobs (Hales, op
cit.; Elias and White, 1991).  Similarly, at the local level, an analysis of
alternative sources of vacancy information in Cambridgeshire indicated
that the concentration of notified vacancies was on less skilled jobs,
together with clerical and secretarial positions, while only a fraction of
managerial and professional vacancies were notified to the Employment
Service (Tuffnell, 1998).  The evidence nationally suggests that large
organisations were less likely to notify vacancies to the Employment
Service.  Similarly but for quite different reasons, employers offering
very low-paid and casual jobs were also less likely to notify the
Employment Service.  Such jobs were more likely to be filled using
informal recruitment channels.
6.4  The data
21 The National On-line Manpower Information System.
6.4.1  Notified vacancies
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Despite the shortcomings outlined above, the advantage of information
on vacancies notified to Jobcentres for comparative local labour market
analysis is that it was the most consistent source available (see also Green:
2001).  Indeed, despite efforts to set up databases (locally and nationally)
of vacancies advertised in the press or to measure vacancies by means of
surveys of employers, there was no other source of vacancy information
collected or compiled on a consistent basis.  So, information on vacancies
notified to Jobcentres, while partial in coverage, was the best available at
the time of the research.
Whatever their limitations as a source of information on the stock of
unfilled vacancies, surveys of employers remain the only source of detailed
information about the process of recruitment within establishments.
Surveys of employers in the eight ETU pilot and four Control areas
were carried out in 1996 and 1997.22  These surveys were unrepresentative
of the population of all employers in that they concentrated on collecting
information from employers with significant proportions of low-paid
workers.  The two surveys could be linked to provide a longitudinal
panel of employers.
The employer surveys collected a wide range of data about the recruitment
process.  This data covered the procedures and recruitment channels
used, numbers recruited in the past 12 months, turnover, recruitment
difficulties, time taken to recruit, wages offered and a range of related
information.  The data was available for three main groups of employees:
semi-skilled and unskilled, skilled and craft workers and people doing
routine clerical work and sales assistants.   Much of the recruitment data
related to the most recent recruit hired at a wage of less than £4.00 per
hour.
There were two limitations to the Employer Survey data.  First, while
the sample of employers was relatively large by the standards of most
employer surveys, sub-sample size quickly diminished when the data was
disaggregated by area, establishment size and industry.  The statistical
analysis was thus limited to broad groupings of classificatory variables.
Second, the employer surveys covered employers of broad groups of
low-paid workers.  However, the sample was not targeted on employers
whose employees were in receipt of ETU.  Employers were asked
6.4.2  Employer survey data
22 A third survey of employers was carried out in 1999.  However, the number of
employers from 1997 that remained in the sample was relatively small.  This sample
attrition will have introduced a bias into the data (the effect of which is unknown).
Any gain in terms of evidence of longer-term effects of ETU must be balanced against
the loss of reliability introduced by such bias.  For this reason, no analysis was undertaken
with the 1999 sample as it was felt that the impact of ETU on recruitment would have
been most evident around the time of its introduction and that longer-term effects
would be small.  Lissenburgh (2001) examined similar issues using the matched element
of the employer survey over the three sweeps (1996-1999) and found similar results to
those reported here.
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questions which related to their knowledge of ETU and awareness of
employees in receipt of ETU.  However, as ETU was paid to employees,
there was no guarantee that the employer was aware of this fact.  The
sample of employers may thus consist of a mixture of those whose
employees were claiming ETU, those that were in a similar position but
not aware of it, employers whose employees were not claiming ETU
and some who believed their employees were claiming ETU even though
this was not the case.  However, this was a problem only if the effect of
ETU was restricted to employers with ETU claimants as employees.  In
a competitive local labour market this is unlikely as shifts in labour supply
will directly or indirectly affect all employers.
Analysis focused on the research questions set out in Section 6.2.  The
first research question was whether there was evidence of any change in
the pattern, duration and level of vacancies attributable to the introduction
of ETU.  The analysis involved time series analysis of notified vacancies.
Two type of analysis were undertaken.  First, the behaviour of the vacancy
time series was examined for the sub-periods before ETU and after ETU.
If ETU had an effect on the duration and level of vacancies this should
have been evident in the form of a ‘break’ in the vacancy trends in ETU
pilot areas.  It is possible that ETU Scheme A and Scheme B differed in
their impacts and this hypothesis was also tested.  Similarly, if notified
vacancies were affected by the introduction of ETU, then comparative
analysis contrasting the two types of ETU pilot with the Control areas
might reveal the scale and timing of any impacts on vacancies.
ETU, if it had any effect at all on vacancies, could have been expected to
impact on vacancies for semi-skilled and unskilled jobs more than vacancies
for other occupational groups.  Within the limitations of the occupational
vacancy series, the analysis examined specific types of vacancy.  ETU
could also be expected to impact upon ‘hard to fill’ vacancies, especially
where the reason for recruitment difficulty was low pay rather than a
shortage of skills.  The analysis examined the ‘hard to fill’ series as well as
vacancies from specific sectors (such as hotels and catering) where the
likely conditions of employment may have led to a more significant ETU
effect than elsewhere in the labour market.
Analysis of notified vacancies represents an aggregate approach to the
investigation of the impact of ETU on vacancies and provides no direct
evidence of the impact of ETU on recruitment.  Such direct evidence
was provided by the two employer surveys.  While there was no time
series data available on recruitment behaviour in ETU pilot and Control
areas, the 1996 survey represents a ‘before ETU’ baseline.  This can then
be compared with the 1997 survey which provides ‘after ETU’ data and
facilitates a ‘before and after study’ of the impact of ETU on the recruitment
of low-paid workers.  The identification of real differences between the
pre-ETU behaviour and post-ETU behaviour was helped by the linking
of the two employer surveys to form a panel (thus eliminating sampling
variation), albeit at the cost of reducing the sample size.
6.5  Analysis
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The analysis of recruitment behaviour concentrated on differences in
turnover, engagements and, in particular, the time taken to recruit to
low-paid vacancies.  Comparisons of such differences with the Control
areas provided an indication of the extent to which observed changes in
recruitment and vacancy duration would have been expected to occur in
any event, perhaps because of changes in the general level of activity in
the economy.  The hypothesis that the length of time taken to fill a




An introduction to the scope of Employment Service (ES) data on
vacancies and its strengths and weaknesses was provided in the Chapter
6, Section 6.4.  However, two key points are worthy of reiteration here.
First, the ES data series provides only a partial picture of the total number
of vacancies in a local economy.  As a consequence, the results presented
here will be subject to a relatively wide margin of error.  The analyses
should be interpreted with caution.
Monthly vacancy data series were extracted from NOMIS for the period
January 1994 to October 199823  for each of the 12 local areas,24  and for
Scheme A areas (aggregated together), for Scheme B areas (aggregated
together), for Control areas (aggregated together) and for Great Britain.
Four data series were extracted for each area.  These were:
• notified vacancies: vacancies notified to a Jobcentre within a particular
month;
• unfilled vacancies: vacancies which remained unfilled at the end of the
month (i.e. the ‘stock’ of vacancies);
• vacancies filled: vacancies notified to a Jobcentre and filled by a jobseeker
referred by the Jobcentre or another agency to whom ES has copied
the vacancy;
• vacancies cancelled: vacancies withdrawn by ES for any reason other than
they have been filled by ES.
The vacancy series could be disaggregated by occupation and by industry.
However, this level of detail was only available on a quarterly basis.  In
addition, changes in the occupational and industrial classifications used
by ES meant that data on the current occupational classification were
only available from 1994; and on the current industrial classification from
July 1995.




TRENDS IN NOTIFIED VACANCIES IN ETU AREAS
7.1  Introduction
23 The latest date for which data were available at the time of the research.  The ES data
series for the ETU pilot areas up to the end of 1999 are considered in Green (2001).
24 Results at this level of detail are not presented here.
25 All occupations which are not ‘low paid’.
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A list of ‘low-paid occupations’ was derived using data from the New
Earnings Survey relating to earnings in SOC Minor Groups.  The Council
of Europe Decency Threshold was used as a cut-off with any occupation
with average earnings below that level deemed to be low paid26.  The
low-paid occupations identified in this manner are listed in Table 7.1 in
which it is apparent that such occupations were predominantly drawn
from SOC Major Groups 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
Table 7.1  Low paid occupations
SOC Minor Group Occupation title
55 Textiles, garments and related trades
58 Food preparation trades
59 Other craft and related occupations
62 Catering occupations
64 Health and related occupations
65 Childcare and related occupations
66 Hairdressers, beauticians and related occupations
67 Domestic staff and related occupations
69 Personal and protective service occupations nec
72 Sales assistants and check-out operators
79 Sales occupations nec
80 Food, drink and tobacco process operatives
81 Textiles and tannery process operatives
85 Assemblers/lineworkers
86 Other routine process operatives
90 Other occupations in agriculture, forestry and fishing
95 Other occupations in sales and services
99 Other occupations nec
In addition to low-paid occupations, a distinction was also made between
two industries characterised by low pay and the rest of economic activity27.
The two low pay industries were:
• G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles
and personal and household goods, (subsequently referred to as
distribution);
• H: Hotels and restaurants, (subsequently referred to as hotels and
catering).
26 The assistance of Abigail McKnight in providing information and advice on this topic
is acknowledged.
27 These two industries were identified in analyses by Abigail McKnight, Peter Elias and
Rob Wilson as containing particular concentrations of low-paid workers.
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Figures 7.1 to 7.4 show trends in aggregate vacancies (notified, unfilled,
filled and cancelled) for the period from January 1994 to October 1998
for Great Britain, Scheme A, Scheme B and Control areas, respectively.
The following key trends were apparent:
• Marked seasonal variations were evident in the notification of vacancies.
• In all area types there was little evidence for a change (either a significant
increase or a significant decrease) in the number of vacancies notified
to Jobcentres over the period from 1994 to 1998.
• In all area types there was evidence of a steady increase in the number
of unfilled vacancies between 1994 and 1998 – reflecting the general
improvement in economic conditions over the period.28
• There was some evidence in all area types for an increase in cancelled
vacancies, particularly from 1997 onwards.
• In all area types there was some evidence of an increase in filled
vacancies, again particularly from 1997 onwards.
• There was no clear evidence of a ‘break’ in vacancy trends in Scheme
A and Scheme B areas associated with the introduction of ETU; indeed,
the trends follow the same general pattern in all area types.
Aggregate vacancies were disaggregated into low-paid and other
occupations and industries.  A comparison of the occupational structure
of vacancies by ETU scheme types is presented in Table 7.2.29
Table 7.2  Share of notified vacancies accounted for by low-
paid occupations
Per cent
Area 10/94 10/95 10/96 10/97 10/98
Great Britain 55 55 54 54 55
Scheme A 54 55 52 55 52
Scheme B 61 59 59 59 58
Control areas 58 59 56 58 57
From this summary table it is apparent that:
• there was very little difference between area types in the occupational
structure of vacancies: Scheme B had the largest proportion of vacancies
in low-paid occupations of any of the area types, but in all areas the
shares of low-paid vacancies over the period from October 1994 to
October 1998 was in the range 52 per cent to 61 per cent;
• there was no clear trend over time in the occupational structure of
vacancies in any of the area types.
7.2  Trends in aggregate
vacancies
28 As highlighted in Green (2001).
29 The occupational structure of unfilled vacancies shows a very similar pattern to that of
notified vacancies.
7.3  Trends in vacancies in low-
paid occupations and industries
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In Chapter 6 it was hypothesised that the durations of vacancies may
have shortened in the Scheme A and Scheme B areas with the introduction
of ETU.  Information on the changing median duration of filled and
unfilled vacancies, distinguishing low-paid occupations from other
occupations, is presented in Figures 7.5 to 7.8 for Great Britain, Scheme
A, Scheme B and Control areas, respectively.  The main features emerging
are:
• there was relatively little variation in the median time taken to fill
vacancies in low-paid occupations and other occupations both within
and between area types;
• the general trend over the period from 1994 to 1998 was for the
median duration of filled and unfilled vacancies to increase slightly;30
• there were marked seasonal variations in the median duration of unfilled
vacancies31  in all areas;
• across all area types the general trend is for the median duration of
unfilled vacancies in low-paid occupations to be slightly shorter than
that for other occupations.
In the light of these findings it must be concluded that there was no
evidence from these data series that the durations of unfilled vacancies
had become shorter since the introduction of ETU, or shorter in the
Scheme A and Scheme B areas compared to the Control areas.
The industrial analysis of vacancy durations yields no clearer a picture.
In general, the median duration of filled vacancies was shorter for other
industries than for distribution and hotels and catering32  both within and
between area types.  Likewise, the median duration of unfilled vacancies
was also similar for distribution, hotels and catering and other industries
within and between area types.
7.4  Trends in vacancy
durations
30 This was to be expected given the increase in vacancies notified to ES along with the
decline in the number of unemployed over the period in question.
31 The median duration of unfilled vacancies was greatest in the first (i.e. winter) quarter.
32 That is, the industries in which low pay was concentrated.
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Figure 7.1  Trends in aggregate vacancies in Great Britain,
1994-98
Figure 7.2  Trends in aggregate vacancies in Scheme A areas,
1994-98
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Figure 7.3  Trends in aggregate vacancies in Scheme B areas,
1994-98
Figure 7.4  Trends in aggregate vacancies in Control areas,
1994-98
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Figure 7.5  Median duration of vacancies by occupation,
Great Britain, 1994-98
Figure 7.6  Median duration of vacancies by occupation,
Scheme A areas, 1994-98
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Figure 7.7  Median duration of vacancies by occupation,
Scheme B areas, 1994-98
Figure 7.8  Median duration of vacancies by occupation,
Control areas, 1994-98
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The potential effects of the introduction of ETU on employers and
employment would be brought about by the effect of ETU on the supply
of labour available to employers, particularly where the employer has
jobs in which eligible individuals could obtain ETU (that is, jobs offering
employment of at least 16 hours per week at a wage rate of £4.00 per
hour or less).  An improvement in labour supply would reduce the cost
of employment because it would be easier and quicker to recruit, because
employees remain in employment longer, or because wage rates fall.
In seeking evidence of an ETU impact on employment, several types of
effect might be considered.  Following the introduction of ETU any of
the following possibilities, compared to the Control areas, might be observed:
• a faster growth/slower decline in overall employment levels;
• a faster growth of employment in occupations containing a high
proportion of low-paid workers;
• a faster rate of recruitment to low-paid jobs;
• a lower rate of labour turnover from low-paid jobs;
• a greater ability to recruit to low-paid jobs;
• shorter vacancy durations;
• less reported skill shortages;
• a reduced need to raise wages to fill vacancies;
• (possibly) a fall in wage levels in low-paid jobs.
Within ETU pilot areas, differential change between ETU eligible jobs
and non-eligible jobs or between employers who recruited to low-paid
jobs and those who did not might be regarded as prima facie evidence of
substitution effects (if the differences are in the expected directions).  For
example, if the proportion of low-paid jobs that are below 16 hours per
week were to decrease following the introduction of ETU, this might be
indicative of a substitution effect.
This chapter examines the evidence on these issues using data from a
matched sample of employers in ETU pilot and Control areas.
Three surveys of employers have been conducted in the 12 ETU pilot
and Control areas.  The first survey covered 2,401 establishments and
was conducted in 1996.  A second survey was carried out in 1997 and a
third in 1999, three years after the first.  The employer surveys were
designed and managed by PSI while data collection was undertaken by
NOP.  The data was made available to IER by PSI as part of the ETU
evaluation programme.
RECRUITMENT AND VACANCIES AT ESTABLISHMENT LEVEL8
8.1  Introduction
8.2  A matched sample of
employers in ETU areas
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An important feature of the employer samples was a panel of establishments
contacted on each of the three occasions.  As with all panel surveys, some
initial respondents dropped out of the sample at the second and third
interview stages.  This may have happened because the business had
ceased trading, the establishment had relocated to an area outside the
ETU pilot study, the employer refused to be interviewed on the second
or third occasion or for some other reason.  The level of sample attrition
was significant.  In 1997 the number of employers re-interviewed was
1,494 (62 per cent of the original 2,401) while the number of employers
remaining in the sample had fallen to just 808 by 1999 (34 per cent of the
original sample of employers).
The research reported in this chapter was based on a matched sample of
1,494 employers interviewed in both 1996 and 1997.  This matched
sample provided a longitudinal perspective on employment in the 12
areas over the 12 months that spanned the introduction of ETU and thus
provides the basis for a ‘before and after’ examination of the effect of
introducing ETU.  The use of a panel of employers ensures that any
observed differences in employment, recruitment or similar matters reflect
changes in employer behaviour rather than be the consequence of random
sampling variation (as would be the case if a different sample of employers
was used before and after the introduction of ETU).  Consideration was
given to extending the analysis to embrace the third, 1999 survey of
employers.  However, this was not undertaken for two reasons.  First,
the impact of ETU (if any) was most likely to be observed in the period
1996-97 when the contrast between pre- and post-ETU employer
behaviour might be most marked.  Second, any benefits from a longer-
term perspective of ETU effects could be expected to be offset by the
difficulty of comparing employer behaviour in significantly different labour
market conditions and the impact of the unknown, but potentially
significant bias introduced into any such comparison by the substantial
sample attrition of the panel.
Establishments in the 12 areas covered by the ETU evaluation programme
were initially sampled in 1996 in a manner whereby the probability of
selection was approximately proportionate to the size (employment) of
the establishment.  However, in order to provide an adequate sample in
sectors containing relatively few establishments but a high proportion of
low-paid jobs (where employees were likely to be eligible for ETU),
some sectors were over-sampled.  The main focus of over-sampling was
the retail/catering and other personal/community service industries.
Over-sampling was not necessary in the case of distribution (which
contained many low-paid jobs) because the number of establishments in
the population was large.  For some purposes (such as describing the
population of employers in each area) it was necessary to apply weights
to the data in order to correct for the sampling procedures used.  However,
such weighting of the data was unnecessary when inferences were being
drawn about changes or differences.  The analysis reported in this chapter
was, consequently, based on unweighted data.
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Table 8.1 describes the broad scale and direction of employment change
across ETU areas in terms of total employment and employment in the
three broad occupational sectors for which detailed information was
collected.  The table suggests that across all ETU areas, 62 per cent of
employers had experienced an increase in total employment between
1996 and 1997.  This pattern was broadly similar in each of the two ETU
pilot areas and the Control areas although slightly more of establishments
in the Control areas experienced some employment growth than was the
case in either of the ETU pilots areas.
Table 8.1  Establishments reporting employment change, by
area and occupational group
Percentage within areas
Scheme A Scheme B Control All areas
Total employment
Rising 62 61 64 62
Stable or falling 38 39 36 38
Semi-skilled and unskilled manual
Rising 64 63 59 62
Stable or falling 36 37 41 38
Skilled manual
Rising 67 62 64 65
Stable or falling 33 38 36 35
Clerical and sales
Rising 66 67 65 67
Stable or falling 34 33 35 33
Against this background of general employment growth, the pattern of
change was somewhat different when the three broad occupational groups
were considered separately.  In the case of unskilled and semi-skilled
jobs, higher proportions of establishments in both Scheme A and Scheme
B areas reported rising employment than did establishments in the Control
areas.  Similarly, establishments in Scheme A areas and (to a lesser extent)
Scheme B areas were also more likely to report an increase in employment
in skilled manual and clerical and sales jobs than establishments in Control
areas.  In the case of skilled manual jobs, 64 per cent of establishments in
the Control areas reported an increase in employment.  This was less
than the proportion in Scheme A areas but more than in Scheme B areas.
This fairly crude evidence suggests that employers who employed low-
paid workers were more likely to be increasing the employment of such
groups in the workforce if the establishment was located in one or other
of the ETU pilot areas.
Rather than simply looking at whether an establishment experienced
employment growth or not, the actual change in the number of employees
8.3  Employment change
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can be considered.  Both the 1996 and 1997 surveys collected information
about the number of employees within the three broad occupational
groups.  Table 8.2 sets out the levels of employment reported by employers
in the matched sample and the change in employment estimated to have
taken place over the interval between the two surveys.  Total employment
refers, in this instance, to all employment in the three low-paid
occupational groups (and not to all employees)
The evidence suggests that the number of employees in sample
establishments increased by over a third (38 per cent) during 1996-97.
Recorded employment growth was greatest in Scheme A areas where it
increased overall by just over 50 per cent.  This figure was 10 percentage
points above that recorded by establishments in the Control areas and
well over twice that recorded in Scheme B areas where employment
increased by just 23 per cent.  On the face of it such a pattern of
employment change lends mixed support to the hypothesis that there
were significant ETU effects.  While the higher growth of employment
in Scheme A areas was as might be expected, the relatively low growth
of employment in Scheme B areas (where ETU is paid at higher rates) is
not consistent with the hypothesis that ETU encouraged job growth.
However, a low take-up of ETU in Scheme B areas (so there was no
ETU effect) or other unobserved differences between areas could also
have produced the pattern of employment change observed.
Table 8.2  Employment change, 1996-1997, by area
Column percentages
Change
Employment Employment Employment 1996-97
Area 1996 1997 change 1996-97 (%)
Scheme A areas 34247 51622 17375 51
Scheme B areas 34722 42653 7931 23
Control areas 29810 42079 12269 41
All areas 98779 136354 37575 38
An even more complex pattern emerges when employment change is
considered at the level of the broad occupational group.  Table 8.3 sets
out the levels of employment in establishments in the matched sample in
1996 and 1997 for each occupational type together with the percentage
rate of change.  The different experience of the three areas is immediately
apparent.  The overall growth of low-paid employment of 41 per cent in
Control areas was largely the product of a virtual doubling of recorded
employment in clerical and sales jobs.  In the other two groups (skilled
and semi-skilled/unskilled) employment growth was much more modest
(just 9 per cent for skilled jobs and 10 per cent for semi-skilled/unskilled
jobs).  This pattern of employment change was not dissimilar to that
found in Scheme B areas where substantial growth (56 per cent) in clerical
and sales jobs offset virtually unchanged levels of employment in the
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other two occupational groups.  In contrast, the reported changes in
employment in Scheme A areas were strikingly different.  Strong growth
in employment took place in clerical and sales jobs (as in the other areas),
but there was also substantial growth in the number of both skilled and
semi-skilled employees.  Indeed, employment growth was greatest in the
former (skilled).




Employment Employment Employment 1996-97
Area 1996 1997 change 1996-97 (%)
Semi-skilled
Scheme A areas 11653 17568 5915 51
Scheme B areas 9847 12239 8608 87
Control areas 9230 13585 4355 47
Skilled
Scheme A areas 15195 15207 12 0
Scheme B areas 9314 8934 -380 -4
Control areas 7411 11554 4143 56
Clerical and sales
Scheme A areas 12375 13567 1192 10
Scheme B areas 8792 9586 794 9
Control areas 5319 10269 4950 93
It is easier to account for such observed differences in employment change
than to explain them.  Such observed differences could have been the
result of the introduction of ETU in Scheme A and Scheme B areas.  If
so, this would suggest that the introduction of ETU was associated with
a positive impact on employment in skilled and semi-skilled manual jobs
(although the lack of any effect in Scheme B areas needs to be explained).
However, such a difference in employment growth could also have
resulted from a differential sensitivity of the three areas to cyclical changes
in aggregate economic activity.  As national employment was growing
over the period, it might have been the case that employment in Scheme
A areas was simply more responsive to such macroeconomic
developments.
The introduction of ETU could have been expected to impact most on
jobs at the lower end of the wage distribution rather than those at the
upper end.  While the three occupational groups were selected because
they contained a high proportion of low-paid jobs, not all jobs within
these groups were low-paid.  If the mechanism driving employment
growth in these job groups was related to the introduction of ETU, it
would be expected that employment would have grown most (or declined
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least) amongst jobs paying a wage of less than £4 per hour (the effective
upper threshold for eligibility for ETU).  If so, the share of such
employment would have increased.  Table 8.4 sets out the estimated
share of each of the three occupational groups in 1997 across the three
ETU areas.  The table also contains information on the change in the
share of each group that was paid less than £4 per hour.  This change is
presented as the percentage point change and thus represents the
percentage of the job group moving into or out of low-paid employment.
Table 8.4  Employment structure, 1996-97, by area and
occupational group
Share of occupational group Share of those earning less
than £4 per week in job group
Percentage share Percentage Percentage share Percentage
of employment point change of employment point change
Area in 1997 1996-97 in 1997 1996-97
Semi-skilled
Scheme A areas 38.3 -2.5 52.5 -5.8
Scheme B areas 39.3 -0.7 58.2 -10.6
Control areas 39.0 -4.2 58.4 -3.3
Skilled
Scheme A areas 26.1 -0.1 18.9 -1.3
Scheme B areas 26.5 -1.9 22.9 +0.9
Control areas 26.3 -1.8 18.9 -1.0
Clerical and sales
Scheme A areas 27.5 -0.5 23.3 -6.1
Scheme B areas 26.3 -1.6 26.2 -5.0
Control areas 26.7 +2.3 27.2 -2.0
Table 8.4 indicates that employment in the three job groups did not
grow by as much as other elements in the workforce of establishments in
the sample.  This is evident from the decreasing shares of semi-skilled
manual, skilled manual and clerical and sales jobs in all ETU areas despite
the growth in numbers employed in these groups (as discussed above).
On average, over half of semi-skilled manual jobs across all three types of
ETU areas were paid at less that £4 per hour in 1997.  This, however,
was a smaller proportion than 12 months earlier (especially in Scheme B
areas).  Only a quarter of clerical and sales workers were receiving less
than £4 per hour in 1997 and this proportion had also fallen sharply
from the previous year.  In both cases, the change in shares of low-paid
jobs was the opposite of what would have been expected if ETU had had
an impact.  If ETU had brought about an improved supply of labour to
low-paid jobs then the share of such jobs would have been expected to
decrease at a slower rate in the ETU pilot areas than in the Control areas.
81
In fact, the reverse was the case with the fall in share of low-paid semi-
skilled and clerical jobs being greater in the ETU pilot areas than in the
Control areas.  Only in the case of skilled manual workers in Scheme B
areas did the share of low-paid employment change in the expected
direction.  Against the general trend, their share of employment increased
slightly.  This might be considered as evidence that ETU had increased
the employment of low-paid skilled workers relative to those paid in
excess of £4 per hour.  Offsetting this positive finding of an impact, it
must be acknowledged that such an effect was not evident in regard to
the other two occupational groups or observed in Scheme A areas.
However, since the ETU subsidy was greatest in Scheme B areas, it was
plausible that any effect might have been most evident in those areas.
ETU might affect employment through changes in employers’ recruitment
practices.  This could happen because the employer has greater success in
recruiting workers to low-paid jobs, or it may be that employers saw a
cost advantage in actively seeking to recruit to low-paid jobs (which they
did not do before ETU was introduced).  Either way, an increase in
recruitment to low-paid jobs would be expected.  The evidence relating
to recruitment from the matched sample of employers in ETU evaluation
areas is now considered.
Two kinds of relevant recruitment information were collected in the
matched sample.  In the first place there was information about the
numbers recruited to the three job groups (semi-skilled manual, skilled
manual and clerical and sales).  Second, there was information about the
wage at which people were recruited.  In particular, information was
collected about the last person recruited to a job paying less than £4 per
hour.  From this and other information collected by the survey it was
possible to identify some key indicators of recruitment behaviour, such
as recruitment rates and whether anyone has been recruited to a low-
paid job.
Table 8.5 presents the estimated mean recruitment rates in establishments
in the sample in 1996 and 199733.  The table suggests that recruitment
rates fell in all three job groups in both Scheme A areas and Control
areas.  In Scheme B areas, recruitment rates to semi-skilled manual jobs
fell (broadly in line with change in the other two areas) but increased in
respect of skilled manual and clerical and sales jobs.  The interpretation of
these changes is not straightforward.
The recruitment rate can fall either because the rate at which new workers
were recruited fell with employment remaining constant, or because total
employment increased with the flow of recruitment remaining constant
8.4  Recruitment of low-paid
workers
33 The recruitment rate is defined as the number recruited to a job group divided by
total employment in that job group)
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(or some combination of both).  In the case of the Control areas, the
substantial growth in all job groups contributed to the fall in recruitment
rates.  This was also the case in Scheme A areas, and Scheme B areas in
respect of semi-skilled workers.  However, in the case of skilled manual
and clerical and sales jobs, in both ETU pilot areas (Scheme A and Scheme
B) there was little or no growth in employment and the changes in
recruitment rates reflected changes in recruitment activity.  The positive
changes in the recruitment rates in Scheme B areas are most striking.
They suggest that in the face of falling employment (skilled jobs) or very
modest employment growth (clerical and sales) recruitment activity
increased at a faster rate than employment.  As the largest ETU benefits
were paid to claimants in Scheme B areas, this again provides some support
for the proposition that ETU has impacted on recruitment in this area.
Table 8.5  Recruitment rates, by ETU area, 1996-97
1996 1997 Change 1996-97
Scheme A areas
Semi-skilled 61.7 54.6 -7.1
Skilled 42.9 29.6 -13.3
Clerical and sales 32.1 28.7 -3.4
Scheme B areas
Semi-skilled 85.3 75.1 -10.2
Skilled 39.6 44.0 +4.4
Clerical and sales 32.9 41.3 +8.5
Control areas
Semi-skilled 73.5 64.4 -9.1
Skilled 37.4 28.4 -9.0
Clerical and sales 29.7 25.0 -4.7
Despite the suggestion in Table 8.5 that recruitment may have increased
rather more than expected in Scheme B areas, such evidence cannot be
conclusive since many other factors may affect recruitment and such
factors cannot be guaranteed to have remained unchanged across the
three types of areas.  To take account of these factors requires the use of
multivariate analysis and the modelling of recruitment.
In the model of recruitment the dependent variable was the probability
(or more accurately, the odds) of an establishment recruiting a low-paid
worker (earning £4 per hour or less) or not.  Using information from
the matched sample, establishments were classified into those that had
recruited at least one worker at or below £4 per hour in the preceding
12 months.  The analysis was conducted separately for recruitment in
1996 and 1997.  A very simple model of recruitment was used in which
the likelihood of recruiting a low-paid worker was regressed against
variables reflecting the location of the establishment (large urban, rural,
seaside), ETU evaluation area, size of establishment, industry, occupational
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shares and awareness of in-work benefits.  This was less of a model of
recruitment than an attempt to standardise the employer recruitment
data.
Table 8.6  Variables used in the recruitment model
SCHEMEA Located in Scheme A area
SCHEMEB Located in Scheme B area
SEASIDE Located in seaside area
RURAL Located in rural area
LURBAN Located in large urban area
IND2 Manufacturing
IND3 Construction
IND4 Distribution and hotels and catering
IND5 Transport
IND6 Finance, banking, insurance and real estate
IND7 Public administration, education and health
SIZE1 2-24 employees in 1997
SIZE3 50-99 employees in 1997
SIZE4 100-199 employees in 1997
SIZE5 200+ employees in 1997
SIZE1@6 2-24 employees in 1996
SIZE3@6 50-99 employees in 1996
SIZE4@6 100-199 employees in 1996
SIZE5@6 200+ employees in 1996
RCLSAPC % total in clerical and sales, 1997
RSSKPC % total in semi-skilled, 1997
RSKPC % total in skilled, 1997
CLSAPC % total in clerical and sales, 1996
SSKPC % total in semi-skilled, 1996
SKPC % total in skilled, 1996
AWARE Was aware of in-work benefits in 1997
AWARE96 Was aware of in-work benefits in 1996
The variables used in the analysis are listed in Table 8.6.  The analysis
used logistical regression analysis with a binary dependant variable taking
the value 1 if the establishment recruited a low-paid worker (and zero if
it did not).  The results of such an analysis must be related to a ‘base case’.
In this instance the base case was an establishment located in ‘a large
town’ in an ETU Control area.  It was an establishment of between 25
and 49 employees in the primary and public utility sector.  The respondent
was not aware of in-work benefits at the time of the survey34.  The result
of the analysis is presented in Table 8.7.
34 The choice of base case is essentially an arbitrary one and does not affect the significance
of the results.
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Table 8.7  The determinants of recruitment to low-paid jobs
The odds of recruiting a low-paid worker in 1996
Variable B S.E Sig Exp(B)
SCHEMEA -.0829 .1390 .5509 .9204
SCHEMEB .1764 .1409 .2105 1.1930
SEASIDE -.0344 .1608 .8309 .9662
RURAL -.0217 .1601 .8923 .9786
LURBAN .0261 .1628 .8727 1.0264
IND2 -.3724 .2400 .1208 .6891
IND3 -.4293 .3283 .1911 .6510
IND4 .9383 .2037 .0000 2.5557
IND5 -.3769 .2466 .1264 .6860
IND6 .0300 .3095 .9229 1.0304
IND7 .2325 .2303 .3125 1.2618
SIZE1@6 -.4338 .1751 .0132 .6481
SIZE3@6 .1547 .2304 .5020 1.1673
SIZE4@6 .1210 .2537 .6334 1.1286
SIZE5@6 -.4015 .2710 .1385 .6693
SSKPC .0186 .0047 .0001 1.0187
SKPC .0048 .0047 .3072 1.0048
CLSAPC .0062 .0048 .1977 1.0062
AWARE96 .1577 .1432 .2705 1.1709
Constant -.9540 .5401 .0774
The odds of recruiting a low-paid worker in 1997
Variable B S.E. Sig Exp(B)
SCHEMEA .1300 .1419 .3597 1.1388
SCHEMEB .0708 .1417 .6173 1.0734
SEASIDE .0949 .1631 .5607 1.0995
RURAL -.0545 .1624 .7370 .9469
LURBAN -.3443 .1657 .0377 .7087
IND2 -.4843 .2556 .0581 .6161
IND3 -.4533 .3635 .2125 .6356
IND4 1.2010 .2052 .0000 3.3235
IND5 -.1563 .2560 .5414 .8553
IND6 -.2108 .3380 .5329 .8099
IND7 .3269 .2339 .1621 1.3867
SIZE1 -.3219 .1763 .0678 .7248
SIZE3 .1733 .2238 .4389 1.1892
SIZE4 -.3778 .2535 .1361 .6854
SIZE5 -.0982 .2553 .7004 .9064
RSSKPC .0161 .0035 .0000 1.0162
RSKPC .0038 .0036 .2887 1.0038
RCLSAPC .0017 .0037 .6382 1.0017
AWARE .8875 .1745 .0000 2.4291
Constant -1.9443 .4294 .0000
The results suggest that similar factors determined the recruitment of
low-paid workers in both 1996 and 1997.  The significant determinants
of the odds of recruiting a low-paid worker in 1996 were IND2, IND4,
SSK, and SIZE1.  In 1997 the significant variables were the corresponding
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variables for 1997 (IND2, IND4, RSSK, SIZE1@6) plus LURBAN and
AWARE.  The results suggest that, compared to the base case,
establishments which were in manufacturing were less likely to recruit
low-paid workers while those in distribution and hotels were very much
more likely.  Very small establishments were less likely to recruit low-
paid workers while establishments with a high proportion of semi-skilled
manual employees in their workforce were more likely.  In 1997, it
appeared that establishments located in large urban areas were less likely
to recruit low-paid workers.  Of particular interest is the change in the
significance of the variable measuring awareness of in-work benefits
(AWARE96 and AWARE).  In 1996 (before the introduction of ETU)
establishments in which the respondent was aware of in-work benefits
was no more likely to recruit a low-paid employee than other
establishments.  However, in 1997 (after the introduction of ETU)
awareness of in-work benefits was associated with a greater likelihood of
recruiting a low-paid worker.  This points to the introduction of ETU
having had some impact on recruitment even though the area-based
indicators of ETU (SCHEMEA and SCHEMEB) were not significant in
their own right.
The impact of ETU should be most evident at the margin of recruitment,
that is where an employer was wavering between recruiting a low-paid
worker and recruiting some other type of worker.  To explore this
possibility, the analysis was applied to establishments that did not recruit
any workers to low-paid jobs (less than £4 per hour) in 1996.  Selecting
those employers who had not recruited to a low-paid job in 1996, a new
binary variable was defined such that it had the value 0 if the establishment
had not recruited a low-paid worker in 1997 and 1 if it had recruited a
low-paid worker in 1997.  The explanatory variables used in the analysis
of ‘switching’ to low-paid recruitment were the same as for the preceding
analysis of recruitment.  The results of this analysis are shown in Table
8.8.
The result of the multivariate analysis of recruitment of low-paid workers
(from not employing low-paid workers in 1996 to recruiting low-paid
workers in 1997) was very similar to the results for the recruitment of
low-paid workers in general, with one important exception.  As before,
an establishment was less likely to have switched to the recruitment of a
low-paid worker if it was a manufacturing establishment and more likely
to have done so if it was in distribution and hotels.  An establishment was
also more likely to have switched to recruiting low-paid workers, the
greater was the proportion of semi-skilled jobs in its workforce.  The
impact of ETU might be indicated by the very strong association between
the awareness of in-work benefits (AWARE) and increased odds of
recruiting to a low-paid job.  However, for the first time in the analysis,
establishments located in Scheme A areas appeared to have been more
likely to have recruited to low-paid jobs (SCHEMEA) than employers
located elsewhere.  This variable was significant at the 90 per confidence
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limit (although not at the 95 per cent level).  Taken together, the
significance of AWARE and SCHEMEA are at least suggestive of a weak
ETU effect on the recruitment of workers paid less than £4 per hour.
Table 8.8  Factors associated with the recruitment of a low-
paid worker in 1997 (when not having recruited a low-paid
worker in 1996)
Variable B S.E. Sig Exp(B)
SCHEMEA .6199 .3204 .0530 1.8588
SCHEMEB .4710 .3325 .1566 1.6017
SEASIDE .4753 .3633 .19081 .6085
RURAL .5779 .3829 .1312 1.7822
LURBAN .1397 .3888 .7194 1.1499
IND2 -1.0629 .5174 .0399 .3455
IND3 -.0996 .5935 .8667 .9052
IND4 .9009 .4143 .0297 2.4617
IND5 -.3414 .4848 .4813 .7108
IND6 -1.0459 .8346 .2101 .3514
IND7 -.0938 .4688 .8415 .9105
SIZE1 -.2529 .3686 .4926 .7765
SIZE3 -.4738 .5101 .3530 .6226
SIZE4 -.3883 .5237 .4584 .6782
SIZE5 -.3193 .5077 .5294 .7266
RSSKPC .0174 .0074 .0183 1.0176
RSKPC .0071 .0073 .3294 1.0072
RCLSAPC .0012 .0079 .8766 1.0012
AWARE 1.0879 .4225 .0100 2.9681
Constant -3.3273 .9197 .0003
If ETU had induced an improvement in labour supply, this would be
likely to have been accompanied by a fall in the average time taken to fill
a vacancy (the duration of a vacancy).  If employers’ demand for labour
was rising, then such improvements in the supply of labour would have
resulted in the duration of vacancies increasing less quickly than would
have been the case in the absence of ETU.  The duration of vacancies
can thus be used as an indicator of the impact of ETU.  Changes in
vacancy durations or differences across areas may provide evidence of
differential impacts on groups in the workforce (substitution) or on
different employers (displacement).
Ideally, an analysis of vacancy durations would compare the time taken
to fill low-paid jobs with the time taken to fill other jobs.  The ETU
employer survey did not, however, collect detailed information about
the recruitment of workers other than the three low-paid groups.  As a
result, the ideal comparison was not possible.  However, other comparisons
were feasible.  In particular, recruitment to jobs with a potential for ETU
eligibility (those offering 16 or more hours of low-paid work per week)
could be compared to jobs offering less than 16 hour per week (and thus
ineligible for ETU).  It was also possible to examine the duration of
8.5  Recruitment and vacancy
durations
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vacancies for low-paid job vacancies in establishments that were aware of
in-work benefits and contrast such a duration with that in establishments
where the employer was unaware of in-work benefits.
The period 1996-97 was a period of rising demand for labour in all three
ETU areas.  Employment in the three job groups covered by the sample
increasing sharply.  In this context, it was not surprising to find that the
mean duration of time taken to fill a vacant job paying £4 per hour or
less increased from 12.7 days in 1996 to 15.1 days in 1997.  This increase
reflected the increased pressure of demand for labour in that period.  The
increase in the mean time to fill a vacancy was observed in all three
evaluation areas, as shown in Table 8.9 below.




1996 1997 change 96-97
Scheme A areas 14.1 17.9 27.0
Scheme B areas 13.3 14.8 11.3
Control areas 10.9 12.9 18.3
All areas 12.7 15.1 18.9
Table 8.9 shows that vacancy durations tended to be rather longer in
both the ETU pilot areas when compared with the Control areas.  This
was the case in both 1996 and 1997.  Such a difference could reflect a
range of differences other than ETU between the areas, such as different
occupational structure, different methods of recruitment, different wages
rates and so forth.  In view of this, evidence of an ETU impact may be
better sought by considering the relative change in vacancy durations
across the areas rather than in absolute differences in the time taken to fill
vacancies.  In this respect, the evidence in Table 8.9 is contradictory.
Overall, the mean duration of a vacancy across all three areas increased
by just under 19 per cent between 1996 and 1997.  The change in the
mean duration of a vacancy in the Control areas was almost exactly the
same as this overall average.  However, while the increase in vacancy
duration was much lower in Scheme B areas, vacancy durations increased
at a faster rate in Scheme A areas.  This result might have been expected
since, as discussed above, there was very little employment growth in
semi-skilled and skilled manual job groups in Scheme B areas while there
was much greater employment growth in all job groups in Scheme A
areas and in the Control areas.
Further comparisons can be made by considering the duration of vacancies
for ‘ETU-eligible’ and ‘ETU-non eligible’ jobs (approximately identified
in terms of hours of work and pay).  It might be expected that vacancies
that were eligible for ETU would be easier to recruit to and thus have a
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smaller increase in vacancy duration than other jobs.  Table 8.10 presents
measures of the mean vacancy durations in jobs distinguishing between
those that were potentially ETU-eligible (16+ hours of work) and where
the employer was aware of in-work benefits.
Table 8.10  Mean vacancy duration, by area, hours and
awareness of in-work benefits
Percentage
1996 1997 change 96-97
16 or more hours
Scheme A areas
Aware 14.5 15.8 9.0
Not aware 17.2 45.1 162.2
Total 15.0 18.9 26.0
Scheme B areas
Aware 14.8 16.2 9.5
Not aware 10.7 17.2 60.7
Total 14.0 16.3 16.4
Control areas
Aware 13.6 13.6 0
Not aware 8.6 12.8 48.8
Total 12.8 13.5 5.4
Less than 16 hours
Scheme A areas
Aware 14.2 14.9 4.9
Not aware 10.7 15.5 44.9
Total 12.1 15.0 24.0
Scheme B areas
Aware 8.9 10.1 13.5
Not aware 17.3 9.5 -45.1
Total 10.8 10.0 7.4
Control areas
Aware 7.5 11.9 58.7
Not aware 6.6 7.0 6.1
Total 7.3 11.6 58.9
If ETU were to have had an impact on vacancy durations in the pilot
areas, it would be expected that the duration of ‘eligible’ vacancies would
increase least in Scheme B areas and most in the Control areas.  Little
difference would be expected across the three types of area in respect of
ineligible jobs offering less than 16 hours per week.  The evidence from
Table 3.10 was, however, somewhat mixed.  In the case of jobs offering
16 or more hours of work per week (ETU eligible), the average time
taken to fill vacancies did indeed increase more slowly in Scheme B areas
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than in Scheme A areas (as might be expected since Scheme B offers the
higher benefit).  However, the lowest increase in vacancy duration was
in the Control areas and this was counter to what might have been
expected.  Turning to vacancy durations of jobs offering different hours,
the increase in vacancy durations in low-paid jobs offering less than 16
hours per week was greater than the change in duration of vacancies for
jobs offering 16 hours or over.  This was what would have been expected
if ETU had affected the 16+ hours jobs more than jobs offering lower
hours.  However, this suggestion of an ETU effect must be tempered by
the fact that the difference was also evident in the Control areas where
ETU was not on offer.
Table 8.10 highlights, yet again, the apparent importance of employer
awareness of in-work benefits.  Irrespective of whether ETU was on
offer in an area or not, the increase in vacancy duration was consistently
lower in establishments that were aware of in-work benefits.  One
interpretation of this association is that when an employer reported an
awareness of in-work benefits, this was an indication that such benefits
were actually being claimed by some of their employees.  If so, awareness
of in-work benefits was an indicator of those establishments where in-
work benefits were being claimed and where the impact on labour supply
was real (as opposed to potential).
The complexity of the vacancy creation process and employers’
recruitment practices was such that it would be difficult to isolate the
impact of a measure such as ETU without attempting to account for the
many other factors that impinged on the time taken to fill a vacancy.  An
adequate explanation of changes in vacancy durations required multivariate
analysis that would standardise for establishment characteristics and local
labour market conditions.  A variety of models of vacancy duration were
estimated from the matched sample of ETU area employers, using the
wide variety of data collected in the surveys.  Such data included the
hours of work, the recruitment channels used, the hiring standards used
(in terms of previous experience, age and other characteristics) as well as
industry, occupation, establishment size and type of labour market and
location.  Despite previous success at modelling such processes (see
Hasluck, 1995) no satisfactory model of the vacancy filling process from
which the effect of ETU could have been isolated was identified.
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This report has examined the evidence relating to the impact of the
introduction of ETU on employers and employment.  The research
considered the mechanism by which ETU might bring about employment
effects.  If ETU made employment in low-paid jobs more attractive to
some jobseekers than hitherto in the absence of the ETU benefit payment,
employers will have experienced an increase in the flow of jobseekers
willing to work in low-paid jobs.  The consequence of such an
improvement in labour supply might have been to allow employers in
areas where ETU was on offer to fill job vacancies more quickly and, in
more extreme cases, to fill job vacancies that would have previously
remained unfilled.  While the overall number of jobs may not have been
changed as the result of ETU, it is possible that the proportion of jobs
that were filled had increased, representing an increase in the effectiveness
of the job matching process performed by the labour market.
If ETU had an effect on employment of the form outlined above, this
suggests that it is through an examination of vacancies and recruitment
that evidence of an ETU effect will be found.  Changes in the number of
unfilled vacancies and the time taken to fill them before and after the
introduction of ETU, and comparisons of ETU pilot and Control areas,
may provide indicators of the impact of the introduction of ETU.  This
report has examined the evidence relating to these aspects of ETU.  Two
types of analysis were undertaken.  In the first, a broad perspective was
taken by examining vacancy flows at the level of the ETU pilot and
Control areas.  The second approach considered evidence from individual
employers about their experience of the recruitment of workers to low-
paid jobs.
The analyses of Employment Service (ES) data on notified vacancies
revealed no clear evidence of ETU having had an impact on:
• the structure of vacancies; or
• the time taken to fill vacancies;
in Scheme A and Scheme B areas relative to either the Control areas or
relative to Great Britain as a whole.
This does not necessarily mean that ETU had no impact on the recruitment
process and the structure of vacancies.  Rather, it may mean that any
impact was small relative to other impacts on the notification of vacancies
to ES and other influences on the manner and speed by which vacancies
were filled/remained unfilled.  No evidence was available on the precise
CONCLUSIONS9
9.1  ETU and the recruitment
process
9.2  ETU and notified vacancies
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nature of other influences nor were such influences quantified.  However,
two possible factors other than ETU that might have affected vacancy
notifications were:
• a drive by ES during the ETU pilot period to increase the number of
vacancies notified by employers;
• an improvement in economic conditions such that jobseekers took
longer assessing potential job opportunities, with vacancies remaining
unfilled for slightly longer.
Vacancies in a local economy may have been generated by employment
growth, skills shortages and labour turnover, as well as by policy initiatives
such as ETU.  Moreover, the relative importance of these factors may
vary between local areas, hence the relative impact of each was difficult
to assess.
The second element of the research considered evidence relating to
employment, recruitment and vacancy durations from a sample of
employers in the three types of ETU area.  Some evidence of an ETU
effect was found but such evidence was, at best, weak and was, at times,
contradictory.
Inspection of evidence relating to employment change provided little
clear indication that the introduction of ETU was associated with an
increase in employment in ETU pilot areas.  The employment share of
low-paid workers was declining in all areas and decreased at a higher rate
in the ETU pilot areas than in the Control areas.  However, the increasing
share of skilled manual employment in Scheme B was in marked contrast
to this general picture and might be indicative of some ETU effect
(especially as ETU was paid at a higher rate in Scheme B areas).  Evidence
relating to recruitment, again, provided only weak and contradictory
support for the hypothesis that the introduction of ETU had led to an
increase in the rate of recruitment to low-paid skilled manual and clerical
and sales jobs.  Where found, this effect was most marked in Scheme B
areas.
In order to isolate ETU effects from other influences on recruitment,
multivariate analysis was used to model the recruitment process.  The
model found that whether or not an establishment recruited a low-paid
worker was significantly influenced by the type of activity undertaken
(industry) and size of establishment.  While no direct evidence of an
ETU effect was found, employers were more likely to have recruited to
low-paid jobs after ETU was introduced if they were aware of in-work
benefits.  Such awareness might be an indication of actual experience of
ETU by such employers.  Restricting the analysis to employers who did
not recruit a low-paid worker in 1996 but did so in 1997 found similar
factors to be associated with a switch in recruitment but also found some
weak evidence that employers located in Scheme A areas were more
9.3  ETU and recruitment at
establishment level
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likely to have recruited a low-paid worker when not having done so in
the previous year (before the introduction of ETU).  As before, awareness
of in-work benefits was the most strongly related influence on such a
switch in recruitment.
The period covering the introduction of ETU was a period of increasing
demand for labour and this was reflected in the evidence of increasing
vacancy durations across all areas.  If ETU facilitated the recruitment of
low-paid workers, such increases might be expected to be lower in the
ETU pilot areas than in the Control areas.  While this was true of Scheme
B areas it was not true of Scheme A areas.  Comparison of ETU ‘eligible’
and ‘ineligible’ jobs found that average vacancy durations increased least
in ETU eligible jobs.  While this was consistent with the presence of an
ETU effect, the presence of this pattern in the Control areas was not.
However, vacancy durations increased less (recruitment was easier)
amongst employers who were aware of in-work benefits than amongst
employers who were unaware of such benefits.  This might be seen as an
indication that any ETU effect was concentrated on establishments in
which employees were not only eligible for ETU but were also actually
claiming it.  Unfortunately, the employer data provides no direct evidence
of actual take-up of ETU.
The lack of any evidence of a strong and significant effect on employers’
recruitment and vacancies arising from the introduction of ETU can be
interpreted in a number of different ways.  In the first place, any such
effects were likely to have been of a small scale.  Given that ETU was
unlikely to increase the number of jobs that employers offer (their demand
for labour), any effect would be limited to making the market for low-
paid jobs more efficient so that a greater proportion of jobs were actually
filled at any time.  If potential ETU effects were of such a modest scale,
then they would be difficult to detect.  This would be because, first, any
ETU effects could easily be overwhelmed by the effects of other factors
inducing change in employment and recruitment (such as changes in
local labour market and macroeconomic conditions, other policy
developments and so forth).  Second, the detection of any small ETU
effect required the data to be sufficiently sensitive to allow such effects to
be seen and isolated from other factors.  As acknowledged in this report,
ES notified vacancies are a fairly crude measure of total vacancies in the
local labour market while the ETU Employer Survey data, while very
detailed, also has its limitations (as do all sample surveys).
The lack of any significant evidence of an ETU effect on employers is
consistent with other research undertaken as part of the evaluation of the
ETU pilots (see, for instance, Lissenburgh, 2001).  However, it is worth
considering whether such a lack of detectable impact matters.  While
one of the objectives of ETU was to increase the incentive of jobseekers
to enter low-paid jobs, a second objective was to raise the real income of
members of low-paid households.  A common criticism made of
9.4  Some concluding thoughts
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interventions in the labour market is that any gains made will be at the
expense of other people in the workforce (through substitution effects
and the like).  However, just as there is little strong evidence of a positive
ETU effect on employment, there is no significant evidence of a negative
impact either.  The recruitment of people who were ineligible for ETU
does not appear to have been adversely affected.  This being so, the lack
of any evidence of a significant labour market impact from the introduction
of ETU can be seen as a very positive finding.  It suggests that an incentive
to enter low-paid employment, and an improvement in the real incomes
of low-paid workers, may be achievable without the offsetting labour
market consequences allegedly associated with such policy intervention.
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APPENDIX TABLES
Table 1  Response Analysis 1996 and 1999
1996 1999
Completed Interview 2,400 2,400
Non-completed contact 259 220
Refusals and quits 687 1,154
Invalid* 1,213 1,650
Total issued 4,559 5,424
Response rate (upper estimate) - contacted eligibles 78% 68%
Response rate (lower estimate) - all valid addresses 72% 64%
No weight applied
* Invalid includes those establishments who had ceased trading, those who were not contacted after five
calls and those who failed the interview screener (not business addresses, sole trader enterprises or
those who employed only voluntary workers)
Table 2  Change in hourly wage offers 1996-99: OLS difference model
(semi-skilled/unskilled job group)
Dependent variable: Change in hourly wage of semi-skilled/unskilled employees
Variable Co-efficient (B) Standard Error B Significance
Constant
3.6777 0.3122 0.0000
Number of employees in establishment in 1996 0.0021 0.0002 0.0000
Hotel/catering industry or other services -0.4746 0.1393 0.0007
Independent establishment 0.2280 0.1119 0.0423
Public sector establishment 0.6735 0.1882 0.0003
Proportion of semi-skilled/unskilled employees who were female in 1996 -0.3932 0.1735 0.0240
Number of semi-skilled/unskilled employees who were paid at a rate of
£4 per hour or below in 1996 -0.0027 0.0012 0.0242
Average gross  hourly pay of semi-skilled/unskilled employees in 1996 -0.7038 0.0471 0.0000
25-50 per cent of the establishment’s sales revenue was accounted for by
wages, salaries and other labour costs in 1996 (private sector only) -0.4989 0.1494 0.0009
50-75 per cent of the establishment’s sales revenue was accounted for by
wages, salaries and other labour costs in 1996 (private sector only) -0.2307 0.2087 0.2696
75-100 per cent of the establishment’s sales revenue was accounted for by
wages, salaries and other labour costs in 1996 (private sector only) -0.7379 0.2775 0.0081
Don’t know what proportion of establishment’s sales revenue was accounted for
by wages, salaries and other labour costs in 1996. -0.2895 0.1404 0.0399
Wage-setting influenced by national agreements in 1999 though not 1996 -0.3927 0.1321 0.0031
Wage-setting influenced by the supply of labour in 1999 though not 1996 0.2554 0.1244 0.0407
Change in the number of semi-skilled/unskilled employees from 1996 to 1999 0.0013 0.0006 0.0445
Area A -0.1100 0.1266 0.3856
Area B 0.0068 0.1283 0.9576
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Table 3  Change in hourly wage offers 1996-99: OLS difference model
(clerical/sales job group)
Dependent variable: Change in hourly wage of clerical/sales employees
Variable Co-efficient (B) Standard Error B Significance
Constant
4.6701 0.4482 0.0000
Number of employees in establishment in 1996 0.0011 0.0005 0.0414
Hotel/catering industry or other services -0.7640 0.2896 0.0088
Public sector establishment -1.0583 0.2745 0.0001
Proportion of clerical/sales employees who worked less than
30 hours per week in 1996 -1.8069 0.3171 0.0000
Average gross hourly pay of clerical/sales employees in 1996 -0.7214 0.0579 0.0000
Don’t know what proportion of establishment’s sales revenue was accounted for
by wages, salaries and other labour costs in 1996 -0.4552 0.1797 0.0118
Change in the proportion of clerical/sales employees who were
female between 1996 and 1999 -1.0069 0.2971 0.0008
Change in the proportion of clerical/sales employees who worked less than
30 hours per week between 1996 and 1999 -0.7208 0.3093 0.0205
Whether any initial training is provided for clerical/sales employees which
requires time away from the job 0.7478 0.1841 0.0000
Number of clerical/sales employees who had been recruited
in the past 12 months, in 1996. -0.0364 0.0088 0.0000
Rising product/service demand 0.6121 0.1724 0.0004
Wage-setting influenced by national agreements in 1999 though not 1996 -0.3777 0.2332 0.1064
Wage-setting influenced by national agreements in 1996 though not 1999 -0.5380 0.2428 0.0275
Wage-setting influenced by other employers behaviour in 1999 though not 1996 0.0845 0.2350 0.7194
Wage-setting influenced by other employers behaviour in 1996 though not 1999 -0.6176 0.2372 0.0097
Wage-setting influenced by the supply of labour in 1999 though not 1996 0.0623 0.2258 0.7828
Wage-setting influenced by the supply of labour in 1996 though not 1999 0.7462 0.2329 0.0015
Wage-setting influenced by local trade unions in 1999 though not 1996 0.1541 0.3324 0.6431
Wage-setting influenced by local trade unions in 1996 though not 1999 0.8367 0.3328 0.0125
Wage-setting influenced by the pay individuals are willing to
accept in 1999 though not 1996 -0.0045 0.2299 0.9842
Wage-setting influenced by the pay individuals are willing to
accept in 1996 though not 1999 0.7064 0.2386 0.0033
Aware of ETU in 1999 but not in 1996 -0.4636 0.1902 0.0154
Area A 0.3454 0.2093 0.1000
Area B -0.1475 0.2127 0.4884
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Table 4  Change in the proportion of low-paid employment 1996-99: OLS difference model
(semi-skilled/unskilled job group)
Dependent variable: Change in proportion of low-paid semi-skilled/unskilled employees
Variable Co-efficient (B) Standard Error B Significance
Constant
0.5174 0.1006 0.0000
Number of employees in establishment in 1996 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0000
Hotel/catering industry or other services 0.2279 0.0417 0.0000
Proportion of semi-skilled/unskilled employees who were paid at a rate of
£4 per hour or below in 1996 -0.7915 0.0524 0.0000
Average gross hourly pay of semi-skilled/unskilled employees in 1996 -0.0524 0.0176 0.0031
Whether often took on semi-skilled/unskilled employees on a short-term
or temporary basis in 1996 -0.1270 0.0330 0.0001
Wage-setting influenced by national agreements in 1999 though not 1996 0.1322 0.0454 0.0038
Wage-setting influenced by national agreements in 1996 though not 1999 0.1959 0.0429 0.0000
Wage-setting influenced by other employers behaviour in 1999 though not 1996 -0.0205 0.0450 0.6478
Wage-setting influenced by other employers behaviour in 1996 though not 1999 0.0310 0.0445 0.4853
Wage-setting influenced by the supply of labour in 1999 though not 1996 -0.0339 0.0454 0.4546
Wage-setting influenced by the supply of labour in 1996 though not 1999 -0.0937 0.0439 0.0333
Wage-setting influenced by local trade unions in 1999 though not 1996 0.0199 0.0608 0.7428
Wage-setting influenced by local trade unions in 1996 though not 1999 -0.0199 0.0783 0.7987
Wage-setting influenced by the pay individuals are willing to accept
in 1999 though not 1996 -0.0015 0.0451 0.9723
Wage-setting influenced by the pay individuals are willing to accept
in 1996 though not 1999 0.0011 0.0414 0.9773
Change in the proportion of semi-skilled/unskilled employees
who were female between 1996 and 1999 -0.2185 0.0779 0.0052
Aware of in-work benefits in 1999 but not in 1996 -0.1014 0.0450 0.0246
Aware of ETU in 1999 but not in 1996 0.0697 0.0348 0.0457
Area A -0.0486 0.0408 0.2341
Area B -0.0195 0.0411 0.6350
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Table 5  Change in the proportion of low-paid employment 1996-99: OLS difference model
(clerical/sales jobs group)
Dependent variable: Change in proportion of low-paid clerical/sales employees
Variable Co-efficient (B) Standard Error B Significance
Constant
-0.0489 0.0557 0.3801
Proportion of clerical/sales employees who worked less than
30 hours per week in 1996 0.4034 0.0558 0.0000
Proportion of clerical/sales employees who were female in 1996 0.1019 0.0530 0.0552
Proportion of clerical/sales employees who were paid at a rate of
£4 per hour or below in 1996 -0.6656 0.0448 0.0000
Number of clerical/sales employees who were paid at a rate of
£4 per hour or below in 1996 -0.0014 0.0003 0.0000
Business had commenced trading at its present location within the
past 12 months in 1996 -0.0101 0.0319 0.7513
Business had commenced trading at its present location within the
past 2 years in 1996 0.0122 0.0415 0.7688
Business had commenced trading at its present location within the
past 5 years in 1996 -0.0828 0.0457 0.0710
25-50 per cent of the establishment’s sales revenue was accounted for by
wages, salaries and other labour costs in 1996 (private sector only) 0.0285 0.0379 0.4514
50-75 per cent of the establishment’s sales revenue was accounted for by
wages, salaries and other labour costs in 1996 (private sector only) 0.0964 0.0481 0.0455
75-100 per cent of the establishment’s sales revenue was accounted for by
wages, salaries and other labour costs in 1996 (private sector only) -0.0273 0.0695 0.6938
Don’t know what proportion of establishment’s sales revenue was accounted for
by wages, salaries and other labour costs in 1996 0.0306 0.0337 0.3647
Whether often took on clerical/sales employees on a short-term or
temporary basis in 1996 -0.0674 0.0281 0.0178
Number of clerical/sales employees who had left jobs or
had jobs terminated in the last 12 months in 1996 -0.0058 0.0020 0.0052
Rising product/service demand -0.0703 0.0264 0.0081
Falling product/service demand 0.0875 0.0398 0.0287
Wage-setting influenced by local trade unions in 1996 though not 1999 0.0775 0.0437 0.0769
Wage-setting influenced by the pay individuals are willing to
accept in 1999 though not 1996 0.1096 0.0329 0.0009
Wage-setting influenced by the pay individuals are willing to
accept in 1996 though not 1999 -0.0581 0.0323 0.0733
Change in the number of clerical/sales employees from 1996 to 1999 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0061
Change in the proportion of clerical/sales employees who worked less
than 30 hours per week between 1996 and 1999 0.2386 0.0492 0.0000
Aware of in-work benefits in 1999 but not in 1996 0.0852 0.0356 0.0170
Aware of ETU in 1999 but not in 1996 -0.0191 0.0268 0.4754
Area A -0.0441 0.0325 0.1754
Area B -0.0396 0.0311 0.2038
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Table 6  Change in hourly wage offers to most recent low-paid recruit 1996-99: OLS
difference model
Dependent variable: Change in hourly wage of most recent low-paid recruit
Variable Co-efficient (B) Standard Error B Significance
Constant 3.5151 0.1844 0.0000
Average gross hourly pay of the most recent low-paid recruit in 1996 -0.9173 0.0561 0.0000
Other services -0.3470 0.0985 0.0005
Production industries -0.1930 0.0696 0.0059
Wage-setting influenced by national agreements in 1999 though not 1996 -0.0538 0.0637 0.3990
Wage-setting influenced by other employers behaviour in 1999 though not 1996 0.1516 0.0773 0.0510
Wage-setting influenced by other employers behaviour in 1996 though not 1999 -0.0346 0.0673 0.6075
Wage-setting influenced by the supply of labour in 1999 though not 1996 -0.1146 0.0750 0.1274
Wage-setting influenced by the supply of labour in 1996 though not 1999 0.1356 0.0656 0.0397
Wage-setting influenced by local trade unions in 1999 though not 1996 -0.0356 0.0908 0.6947
Wage-setting influenced by local trade unions in 1996 though not 1999 0.0671 0.1300 0.6059
Wage-setting influenced by the pay individuals are willing to accept
in 1996 though not 1999 -0.1540 0.06840.0251
Employer experienced recruitment difficulties in 1996 but not in 1999 -0.1309 0.0698 0.0617
Aware of in-work benefits in 1999 but not in 1996 -0.1326 0.0723 0.0679
Aware of ETU in 1999 but not in 1996 -0.0996 0.0522 0.0576
Area A -0.0635 0.0664 0.3395
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